Tuesday, 17 December 2019

Fisking the Horizon trial 1: the meaning of "robust".

Would you like to read 2423 words on the meaning of the word "robust"?

Now you can, below.

It was a big deal in the Post Office Horizon trial because the Post Office contended that Horizon is robust whereas the claimants thought it was only relatively robust.  On such things trials are won and lost, so getting a working definition of robust together was one of the first things the judge did.

The segment below comprises paragraphs 36 - 56 of the Horizon Issues judgment.

Language scholars and engineers may enjoy it:

The meaning of “robustness”

Turning to the disagreement about Issue 3, given the parties disagreed about whether the Horizon system is (or was) “robust”, it is a fairly elementary step to consider the meaning of that term, and how it is being used by the parties. Context is important so far as the meaning of the word “robust” is concerned. If someone is in robust health, it usually is taken to mean that they are healthy, or even very healthy. A robust exchange of views can be a polite way of referring to an argument. Given the importance of the concept to the Horizon system, its prominence in the Post Office’s defence of the system, and its express inclusion (admittedly in inverted commas) in the Horizon Issues, I asked each side in the litigation during oral closing submissions for a reference from their pleadings or submissions for the meaning which they ascribed to the word. I referred to this as their benchmark definition. Robustness was referred to by both sides in the litigation in numerous places, but not always in the same precise terms, and clarity is to be welcomed.

The claimants answered this by reference to the remainder of Issue 3, namely “extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches” and explained that the claimants had found the word robust “difficult to define” other than by reference to this. This would mean therefore that it had no separate independent meaning other than as a summary of the longer second part of Issue 3. In other words, a robust system would be one that is extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches. The claimants also implicitly, if not expressly, criticised use of the term both by the Post Office in its pleadings and written submissions as being more aligned to public relations than as a performance standard.

The Post Office asked for some time to provide the reference that I requested. Given the meaning of “robust” is so central in the Post Office’s defence of the Horizon system, I granted the Post Office the time that was requested.

The Post Office subsequently, after the trial ended, submitted a short document entitled “the Post Office’s case on the meaning of robustness”. This was not what was intended when I sought a reference from the Post Office to their definition, and the document submitted went rather further and made wider ranging submissions. The document did state, so far as the meaning of the word is concerned, the following:
“In Post Office’s submission, the meaning of robustness is a matter for expert opinion. Robustness is a well-established concept in the IT industry and is the subject of academic study: see para. 361 of Post Office’s written closing”.

I do not consider that the meaning of words is a matter for expert opinion. The two experts in this case are IT experts, not experts in linguistics or the meaning of language. However, the meaning of robustness within the field of IT is, arguably, a matter upon which the experts’ opinions should be considered, not least because they were applying that term to their expert exercise. The Post Office also relied upon the 1st Experts’ Joint Statement which in respect of Issue 3 stated the following as agreed:

“There are different dimensions of robustness, such as robustness against hardware failure, software defects and user error. The robustness of the system also depends on the processes around it.

Robustness does not mean perfection; but that the consequences of imperfection must be managed appropriately. If the extent of imperfection is too high, this would be very difficult to do which would imply less robustness.

Horizon has evolved since its inception. Therefore, its robustness may have varied throughout its lifetime. The level of robustness may have increased or decreased as the system was changed.

The existence of branch shortfalls is agreed. The experts do not agree at this point as to whether this indicates any lack of robustness.”

In the areas of disagreement in this Joint Statement, each expert provided the following. Mr Coyne stated (inter alia):

“For the purposes of addressing the robustness of Horizon, I have applied the following definition of robustness:

‘The ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling.’ ”

In consideration of the likelihood of Horizon to be the cause of shortfalls in branches, Horizon is not determined to be robust in this regard because:

(a) it contained high levels of bugs, errors and defects as set out under Issue 1 above which created discrepancies in the branch accounts of Subpostmasters;

(b) it suffered failures of internal mechanisms which were intended to ensure integrity of data;

(c) the system did not enable such discrepancies to be detected, accurately identified and/or recorded either reliably, consistently or at all;

(d) the system did not reliably identify ‘Mis-keying’, which is inevitable in any system with user input, and did not reliably have in place functionality to restrict users from progressing a mis-key;

(e) it required numerous processes and workarounds to be in place to allow Fujitsu to modify data already recorded by Horizon, which would not be required in a “robust” system; and/or

(f) there were weaknesses and risks of errors and other sources of unreliability within Horizon.”

(italics present in original)

Dr Worden stated in the same Joint Statement:

“The definition of 'robust' proposed above by Mr Coyne is not adequate, for reasons given below. The term 'robust' is not, as implied in para 3.1 of the outline, either ill-defined or a piece of IT public relations. Robustness (which is closely related to resilience) is an engineering objective, and large parts of project budgets are devoted to achieving it. It receives its meaning in the phrase 'robust against... [some risk or threat]', and there are a large number of risks that business IT systems need to be robust against - such as hardware failures, communications failures, power cuts, disasters, user errors or fraud. These are the dimensions of robustness.

In all these dimensions, robustness does not mean 'be perfect'; it means 'address the risks of being imperfect'. The extent of robustness is to be interpreted as: in how many dimensions was Horizon robust? and: in each dimension, how large were the remaining risks?

In my report I shall survey the evidence I have found that Fujitsu paid sufficient attention to the dimensions of robustness, and that they did so successfully. I shall also address evidence from Mr Coyne implying that Horizon fell short of its robustness objectives.

In my current preliminary opinion, Horizon is a highly robust system, and this has important implications for the other Horizon issues, notably issue 1.”

It can be seen therefore that Dr Worden in the Joint Statement did not agree Mr Coyne’s definition, and expressly said it was not adequate. In any event, the meaning of any word – even “robust”, or “robustness” – ought to be capable of description by the parties themselves. Although on its face it did not appear that Dr Worden agreed with Mr Coyne’s definition, a footnote in the Post Office first set of post-hearing submissions suggested that Dr Worden was not disagreeing with the first part of Mr Coyne’s text, in other words that part of the text that contained his definition of robustness (which was in italics in the 1st Joint Statement). Obviously if the parties (or their experts) could agree the definition to be applied so far as the Horizon System is concerned, that ought to be identified. I therefore asked the Post Office via email whether it agreed with the definition adopted by Mr Coyne, and if not, what its alternative definition was.

This led to a further document being received from the Post Office dated 18 July 2019. It referred to the passage in the 1st Joint Statement (which is quoted at [40] above) as “the agreed definition”. That rather overlooks that Mr Coyne identified the definition of robustness which he was applying, and Dr Worden expressly disagreed with this in the same Joint Statement under the heading “Areas of Disagreement”, and stated “the definition of ‘robust’ proposed above by Mr Coyne is not adequate, for the reasons given below”. It also overlooks that in the 3rd Joint Statement, paragraph 3.1 had an agreed entry which stated the following:

“Irrespective of how you define the detail of robustness, in line with most other large-scale computer systems, Horizon's robustness has generally improved.

From our experience of other computer systems, Horizon is relatively robust. We agree that 'robust' does not mean infallible and therefore Horizon has and will continue to suffer faults. Robustness limits the impact of those faults and other adverse events.

This increase in robustness has, in part, developed from Post Office discovering bugs/errors and defects in live use and then applying fixes and improving monitoring.”

(emphasis added)

Later in the same document of 18 July 2019 the submission was made by the Post Office that “the robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences”. It was also submitted that “As Post Office understands it, this is what Mr Coyne meant when in his comments in [the 1st Joint Statement] he defined robustness as “the ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling”.

This was precisely the definition which Dr Worden, in his areas of disagreement on the 1st Joint Statement, described as “inadequate”. The end position therefore is as follows.

The claimants found “robustness” difficult to define in the abstract and tied it in with the other wording of Horizon Issue 3; a robust system would be “extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches”. That however is a consequence of how a robust system would operate, not a definition of what robustness means.

The Post Office defined it as follows: “the robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences”. The Post Office was also prepared to accept Mr Coyne’s italicised definition in the 1st Joint Statement, namely ‘The ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling”.

Mr Coyne applied the definition he set out in italics in the 1st Joint Statement, quoted in the immediately preceding paragraph of this judgment and at [41] above.

Dr Worden’s definition was as follows:

“Robustness (which is closely related to resilience) is an engineering objective, and large parts of project budgets are devoted to achieving it. It receives its meaning in the phrase 'robust against... [some risk or threat]', and there are a large number of risks that business IT systems need to be robust against - such as hardware failures, communications failures, power cuts, disasters, user errors or fraud. These are the dimensions of robustness.

In all these dimensions, robustness does not mean 'be perfect'; it means 'address the risks of being imperfect'. The extent of robustness is to be interpreted as: in how many dimensions was Horizon robust? and: in each dimension, how large were the remaining risks?”

The Post Office also submitted that Mr Coyne’s definition was not “materially different” to that of Dr Worden.

The Post Office made submissions in paragraph 3(b) of the written submissions dated 18 July 2019 on robustness that stated that Mr Coyne cannot have intended to exclude the effect of countermeasures when he considered the concept of robustness. I shall return to this topic when dealing with countermeasures. This is because some of the countermeasures considered by Dr Worden are not parts of the Horizon System at all, such as SPMs noticing adverse entries in their branch accounts, and the manual issuing of Transaction Corrections (TCs) by the Post Office (which both parties agree are outside of the Horizon System).

I do however accept the Post Office’s submissions that there is not a great or material difference in the definitions of robustness adopted by the parties’ experts. I do not accept the claimants’ submission that robustness is difficult to define. Dr Worden defined robustness by using what he termed as “the dimensions of robustness”. It is rather circular to describe the meaning of robustness as being “robust against” some particular risk. Although Mr Coyne provided his definition in the 1st Joint Statement, the statement by Dr Worden that this was “inadequate” may only have been aimed at the entirety of Mr Coyne’s entry in the areas of disagreement, as effectively accepted by the Post Office in their most recent written submissions on the subject. Whether that is an explanation of the lack of agreement in the Joint Statement, I also agree with the Post Office that Mr Coyne’s definition is not materially different to that used by Dr Worden.

Robustness is indeed an engineering concept. It means the ability of any system to withstand or overcome adverse conditions. A robust system is strong and effective in all or most conditions. The robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences; this is the same meaning as how robustness was described in the Post Office’s written submissions dated 18 July 19. Robustness does not mean perfection.

The exercise necessary above, to arrive at the definition of robustness in [54] above, is not judicial pedantry. Given the central importance of robustness to the disputes about the Horizon System, and the Horizon Issues, it is in my judgment essential. It is mildly surprising, given how central the assertion of robustness has been to the Post Office’s defence of the Horizon System, that Dr Worden’s interpretation of the term has been relied upon so heavily by the Post Office, given the term was used by the Post Office for some years prior to his involvement.

However, regardless of that passing observation, I find that both experts correctly understood what robustness in fact means, and applied the definition at [54] above in considering their expert evidence. I will return to the expert evidence in some detail later in the judgment, including in the Technical Appendix. 

Peer demands judge-led inquiry into Post Office Horizon fiasco

Lord Arbuthnot
James, now Lord Arbuthnot, former MP for North East Hampshire, reacted to yesterday's High Court judgment by calling for judge-led inquiry into the Horizon fiasco. In a statement issued this morning he said:

“The subpostmasters have been vindicated in every respect.  It is an excellent Christmas present, but won at great cost.  The cost falls partly on the taxpayer but also heavily on the subpostmasters themselves, who will have their damages reduced by the amount the litigation funders will (justifiably) deduct.

“Now that these battles are being won, it is time to turn our attention to how it all came about and went so far.  We need an inquiry and, since the Post Office has repeatedly given inaccurate information including to me, it needs to be led by a judge.  It may be that the best person to conduct the inquiry would be the judge who already has such extensive knowledge of the details, Sir Peter Fraser.  He has done much of the work already."

Lord Arbuthnot led the cross-party parliamentary group of MPs who came together after so many Subpostmasters in their constituencies contacted them begging for help. He remains a member of the All Party Parliamentary Group which looks into matters relating to the Post Office, led by the Labour MP Gill Furniss.

On another note, the Law Gazette has picked up on Sir Peter Fraser's decision to refer the evidence of  Fujitsu employees in the Horizon trial to the Director of Public Prosecutions. There are cans and worms everywhere in this story.

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They did it.

Postmasters celebrating outside the Rolls Building on 16 Dec 2019
What a judgment. What an announcement.

I have spent many days of my life in Court 26 of the Rolls Building. Days I will never get back. Some were tedious, many were fascinating, a few were genuinely dramatic, but none held a candle to what happened yesterday afternoon.

As we know from the press statement on Wednesday last week, this litigation was supposed to be dead. Settled with an apology and £58m in compensation from the Post Office. Well - today's judgment re-energised the corpse and now the judge appears to have set in motion a Frankenstein's monster which could lay about the "nation's most trusted brand" and the IT firm which operates the Post Office's Horizon computer system, Fujitsu.

Court 26 is a big, badly designed room. It is around the size of a basketball court. Whilst it has generous amounts of space compared to most courtrooms, it is unsuited to coping with the dozens of claimants, their families, supporters, journalists, lawyers and observers who packed in there at 1.30pm on Monday 16 December 2019 to witness the second trial judgment being handed down.

Malicious prosecution

The first interesting discussion was about the possibility of claimants going after the Post Office for malicious prosecution. Normally with a settlement of this nature, claimants are prohibited from taking the defendant to court for any reason ever ever again, but the claimants' QC Patrick Green wanted the judge to make an order that claimants who have criminal prosecutions against their name should not be disbarred from pursuing the Post Office over criminal matters, simply because they have signed up to a civil settlement. After seeking agreement from the Post Office's QC Owain Draper (which, it transpired, was a formality), the judge made the order.

Then the judge made an announcement which stood outside of the 177,211 word findings he had just handed down. He told the parties and the court he had "grave concerns" about the evidence of the Fujitsu employees; so much so that he felt the veracity of evidence provided by Fujitsu employees in a number of Post Office prosecutions of Subpostmasters needed to be properly scrutinised. To that end, he would be supplying a dossier to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation.

No one was expecting this. I was sitting with journalists from Computer Weekly, the Daily Mail and the Press Association and we all looked at each other, thinking pretty much the same thing. Fujitsu is now in the game.

The judgment

But why? How? I still haven't read every word of the Horizon trial judgment, so there may be some mitigating comments, but here are the choice quotes:

"The Post Office’s approach to evidence, even despite their considerable resources which are being liberally deployed at considerable cost, amounts to attack and disparagement of the claimants individually and collectively, together with the wholly unsatisfactory evidence of Fujitsu personnel such as Mr Parker."

Who is Mr Parker? Glad you asked:

"Mr Stephen Parker is... the Head of Post Office Application Support. He is therefore a very senior person. He first started work on what was then called the Royal Mail Group Account in 1997, which was before the introduction of Horizon. He has continued to provide support to the Post Office Account in the various roles he has occupied at Fujitsu throughout the whole of Horizon’s life, by which he meant both Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online."

So he, under oath, would tell the judge, the truth, right?

"Mr Parker chose specifically to give the impression in his 1st witness statement that Fujitsu did not have the power (the word Mr Parker expressly chose) to inject transactions into the counter at branches, even though he knew that it did. This paints him in a very poor light as a credible witness."

What did the judge think about Mr Parker's evidence, when exposed to cross-examination?

"I consider that Mr Parker, and the team who assisted him, sought to portray the Horizon system – Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online – in a light as favourable as possible to Fujitsu, regardless of its own internal evidence to the contrary, and regardless of the facts."

And the judge's conclusion about Fujitsu in general?

"Fujitsu do not,... appear to me to have properly and fully investigated.. myriad problems, nor did Fujitsu categorise such incidents correctly. They also seem to have moved away, in their investigations, from concluding that there were any issues with the software wherever it was possible for them to do so, regardless of evidence to the contrary, an approach that has been carried into the Fujitsu evidence for the Horizon Issues trial."

What about the Post Office?

They come in for the sort of pasting we have, perhaps, got used to. Their approach:

"has amounted, in reality, to bare assertions and denials that ignore what has actually occurred… It amounts to the 21st century equivalent of maintaining that the earth is flat.”

“A theme contained within some of the internal documents is an extreme sensitivity (seeming to verge, on occasion, to institutional paranoia) concerning any information that may throw doubt on the reputation of Horizon, or expose it to further scrutiny."

There may be more in parts of the judgment I have not yet reached, but this, to me, is the uncontrovertable conclusion which vindicates everything campaigning Subpostmasters have been saying for years:

"It was possible for bugs, errors or defects of the nature alleged by the claimants to have the potential both (a) to cause apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or transactions, and also (b) to undermine the reliability of Horizon accurately to process and to record transactions as alleged by the claimants.... Further, all the evidence in the Horizon Issues trial shows not only was there the potential for this to occur, but it actually has happened, and on numerous occasions." [my italics]

Alan Bates was the lead claimant in the litigation and founder of the Justice for Subpostmasters' Alliance. His dogged determination to see the Post Office held to account is well documented. He is not a man who likes the spotlight, but I am sure he would have been at court yesterday if he were not recovering from a recent hospital visit. He sent through this statement from his hideout in Wales:

Alan Bates
"This judgment, like that of the Common Issues trial vindicates everything we have been saying for years. The real problem we have been left with is the unrecovered expenses which we have had to incur to pursue the litigation and which include considerable litigation financing fees, all of which have devoured most of the £58m damages, leaving little left to be shared between the group.

"It would seem, from some recent excellent research work Eleanor Shaihk undertook, that successive governments have failed in their statutory duty to oversee and manage Post Office and this is something that we are planning to ask our MPs to raise next year.  If it turns out to be correct, we will be wanting to recover everything we have had to spend doing the job government should have done.

"It isn't over yet, just the end of another chapter."

There will be a number of people who will want to thank Alan for what he has achieved. I wish him a speedy convalescence.

Media interest

After the judgment was handed down, outside court, there was quite the scene. Subpostmasters giving interviews en masse. Banners, photo ops, the lot. I saw a couple of TV cameras there, and whilst I haven't watched it yet, I am told this story finally made it onto the BBC ten o'clock news.

I interviewed every claimant I could persuade to speak to me, then I got a cab to Broadcasting House where I went into the BBC Radio 4 studios to do a hit for Evan Davis's PM programme (listen here, 45 minutes into the show). After that I spoke to Rebecca Jones on the BBC News Channel.
You can also listen to a lengthy interview I conducted this morning with one of the BBCs best presenters, Dotun Adebayo, on BBC Radio 5 live's Up All Night. It starts 33 minutes into the programme.

Also, if I could offer a plug for my current employers, may I recommend you tune in to Channel 5 News at 6.30pm today (Tuesday) 17 December, where I will be discussing this story further.

I hope to have read the whole of the judgment in its entirety by then. And I will post up everything I find on this website.

Final note

There are many takeaways from the second trial judgment day. The main one is that the claimants were apparently told in a pre-judgment meeting with their solicitors that the most they can expect to get from the £58m settlement is £8m - £11m. This is the sum that will be left after the legal fees have been paid and the litigation funders have taken their cut.

Watching what the Criminal Cases Review Commission does next will be interesting. Will it refer all 35 cases it's looking at to the Court of Appeal?

How is the Director of Public Prosecutions going to react to being sent a dossier of evidence by a judge about the quality of evidence from Fujitsu used in criminal prosecutions by the Post Office?

Will there be a public inquiry? The journalist Tony Collins has already explained how it could come about. Don't be surprised if various parliamentarians start calling for one.

UPDATE: At 8.38am this morning Lord Arbuthnot called for a judge-led inquiry. It'll be interesting to see if his Conservative colleagues in the new administration are minded to listen.

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Monday, 16 December 2019

Horizon trial judgment is handed down - inc transcript

Sir Peter Fraser
The handing down of the Horizon trial judgment on 16 dec 2019 was expected to be a damp squib. After all, the parties had settled five days previously.

But it all went off. You can read my report here.

The following is about ensuring the judge's exact comments in court are made available to all as they could be of benefit in any forthcoming legal actions.

The most interesting bit came at the end of the hearing. Having handed down the judgment and dealt with housekeeping, Sir Peter Fraser gave the following announcement:
"Based on the knowledge that I have gained both from conducting the trial and writing the Horizon Issues judgment, I have very grave concerns regarding the voracity of evidence given by Fujitsu employees to other courts in previous proceedings about the known existence of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. These previous proceedings include the High Court in at least one civil case brought by the Post Office against a sub- postmaster and the Crown Court in a greater number of criminal cases, also brought by the Post Office against sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses.
Max Hill QC
After very careful consideration, I have therefore decided, in the interests of justice, to send the papers in the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, so he may consider whether the matter to which I have referred should be the subject of any prosecution."
Sir Peter went on:
"It will be entirely a matter for the DPP what, if anything, he does in respect of this referral... I wish to make it clear that the specific subject to which I will drawing the specific attention of the DPP relates to the evidence on previous occasions of Fujitsu employees."
Notwithstanding the likely homonymical typo in the transcript (I think his Lordship was understood to say "veracity" rather than "voracity"), Fujitsu, and the employees who gave evidence against Lee Castleton, Seema Misra et al are now firmly in the firing line.

If you want to know exactly why the judge felt the need to pass on a folder to the DPP I would recommend you have a crack at the long, but very readable judgment.

In it, the judge finds Andy Dunks, Fujitsu's IT Security Analyst "expressly sought to mislead" him.

He says Fujitsu's Head of Post Office Application Support, Stephen Parker, effectively lied to the court, by choosing "specifically to give the impression in his 1st witness statement that Fujitsu did not have the power (the word Mr Parker expressly chose) to inject transactions into the counter at branches, even though he knew that it did."

And the judge finds in conclusion that Fujitsu:
"do not... appear to me to have properly and fully investigated... myriad problems, nor did Fujitsu categorise... incidents correctly. They also seem to have moved away, in their investigations, from concluding that there were any issues with the software wherever it was possible for them to do so, regardless of evidence to the contrary."
If the DPP is minded to do anything, it might not be long before Inspector Knacker starts knocking on a few doors.

So, for completeness, here is a full transcript of the final hearing, which took place in Court 26 of the High Court's Rolls Building, starting at 2.30pm on Monday 16 Dec 2019. Enjoy:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
No. QB-2016-004710
Rolls Building Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL
Monday, 16 December 2019
BETWEEN:

Claimants

BATES & ORS

- and -

Defendant

POST OFFICE LTD
Before:
MR JUSTICE FRASER

MR P. GREEN QC (instructed by Freeths LLP) appeared on behalf of the Claimants.
MR O. DRAPER (instructed by Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: There are three items on the agenda for this afternoon. The first is handing down the judgment. 

This was distributed in draft on 28 November 2019 to the parties’ legal advisors and two members of the steering committee, but it was under embargo until now. The usual embargo in this case was slightly amended so that the two mediators involved in assisting the parties settle the litigation were also permitted to see the draft judgment. That judgment is to be handed now, which means its contents become public, so I am going to ask my learned clerk to do that. 

There are a number of printed copies. There are ten in folders; there are eight printed copies not in folders. The judgment has three appendices, one is the technical appendix, one is a glossary and one is a summary of the findings on the numbers of bugs, defects and errors that I have found to exist within the Horizon system. 

If anyone who is in court would like a copy and they put their email address on the three forms which have been provided for that purpose, or they give my learned clerk their email address, they will be emailed a copy straightaway after this hearing. 

The judgment is also going to be placed on the Bailii website which is at www.bailii.org with the neutral citation [2019] EWHC 3408 QB. It will also be placed on the judicial website straight after this hearing at www.judiciary.uk. If anybody does go onto the Bailii website and search for it under the name Bates v Post Office, they should just remember that it is the sixth judgment, so it is Bates v Post Office (No 6). That is the first item. 

The next item, Mr Green.

MR GREEN: My Lord, the parties, as your Lordship know, agreed a settlement to be 
incorporated in a Tomlin order to be made by your Lordship, subject to your Lordship’s approval, of course. We have revised it in the light of your Lordship’s observations about the malicious prosecution claims and the provision made for those. 

The structure is that the settlement does not embrace the malicious prosecution claims to which that paragraph refers, which are those of convicted claimants, and that is why there is a provision in paragraph 3 that neither the stay provided for in paragraph 1 nor the discontinuance provided for in paragraph 2 prejudice the right of any convicted claimant to bring an individual claim for malicious prosecution. 

What we have added, your Lordship will see, that last sentence, which is to the extent that convicted claimants require permission under CPR rule 38.7 to make another individual claim for malicious prosecution following discontinuance under paragraph 2 above. Such permission is granted. 

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. Now, that provision – I will just check this with Mr Draper in a moment – as I understand the operation of it is so that if there is any claimant who is currently subject to the group litigation wishes to advance a claim for malicious prosecution---- 

MR GREEN: Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: --that is not caught by the settlement.

MR GREEN: Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Because that is a claim that is actually included on the claim form. 

MR GREEN: Your Lordship is absolutely right. Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. And the discontinuance does not yet occur until an application 
is made under paragraph 2.

MR GREEN: Exactly right. So, it is a Tomlin order until the application for discontinuance is 
made and granted, and then it comes to an end.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right, I am just going to ensure that Mr Draper is on board; I am sure 
he is. Mr Draper, I see you appear for the Post Office today.

MR DRAPER: I do appear for the Post Office. My Lord, yes, the provision there is just to 
ensure there is no possible argument about abuse of process if there is, if you like, what 
might be contended to be a second claim in relation to malicious prosecution.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: That is why I raised the point because I think the intention of the 
parties is that any such claimant in that situation issues a fresh claim form. Is that right? 

MR DRAPER: My Lord, yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: But for the moment this action is not yet discontinued in any event. It 
is just subject to a stay under the Tomlin order.

MR DRAPER: That is right.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. Thank you very much. I am going to make that order. I have 
signed one copy of the Tomlin order. I am going to hand that down now, as well as return the confidential schedules that were lodged at the same time. I will give those to Mr Green. So far as the parties are concerned, is there anything else today? 

MR DRAPER: My Lord, no. 

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. There is one more thing from the court’s point of view. By signing the consent order that I have just signed, today is the final substantive hearing day of the Post Office Group litigation. This means that I am therefore effectively no longer the managing judge. 

What I have to say now does not have any effect upon that function in any event and I will still be able to make any further procedural order in January 2020 if one is sought, as anticipated in paragraph 2 of the Tomlin order, for the withdrawal of the group litigation order. However, I am making these comments now in open court at the conclusion of the Horizon Issues trial in the interests of open justice and transparency. 

The Horizon Issues trial involved very detailed analysis of the Horizon computer system.
In the year of its inception in 2000 up to 2018, in order to address the Horizon issues, both the evidence and the judgment that I have just handed down considered in great detail the contents of contemporaneous documents within Fujitsu and the Post Office dealing with the operation of the Horizon system generally, but particularly in respect of the known existence of Fujitsu of bugs, errors and defects in Horizon. 

Based on the knowledge that I have gained both from conducting the trial and writing the Horizon Issues judgment, I have very grave concerns regarding the voracity of evidence given by Fujitsu employees to other courts in previous proceedings about the known existence of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. These previous proceedings include the High Court in at least one civil case brought by the Post Office against a sub- postmaster and the Crown Court in a greater number of criminal cases, also brought by the Post Office against sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses. 

After very careful consideration, I have therefore decided, in the interests of justice, to send the papers in the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, so he may consider whether the matter to which I have referred should be the subject of any prosecution. 

In arriving at that decision I have considered the relevant authorities, including:
  • R v Patel [2016] EWCA Crim 2001, which was a decision in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division of Lord Justice Simon and Mr Justice Hickinbottom, as he then was, at paragraph 84; 
  • Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208 QB, a decision of Mrs Justice Hallett, as she then was, at paragraph 50; 
  • and a number of others.
It will be entirely a matter for the DPP what, if anything, he does in respect of this referral. The contents of the letter that I send him will be confidential, although I will copy it to the parties in this litigation through their solicitors. 

I wish to make it clear that the specific subject to which I will drawing the specific attention of the DPP relates to the evidence on previous occasions of Fujitsu employees. 

This matter is entirely separate from any aspects of the process currently underway at the Criminal Cases Review Commission in respect of claimants who were convicted. Paragraph 66 of the judgment that I have just handed down explains why this court has no involvement in the process underway at the Criminal Cases Review Commission. 

Mr Green, Mr Draper, nothing else?

MR GREEN: Nothing further, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr Draper?

MR DRAPER: No observations, my Lord.

MR GREEN: My Lord, may we thank you on behalf of all parties for the hard work that has 
gone into several thousand pages of judgments.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. My learned clerk did actually do a word count on all six of the 
judgments and it is just slightly fewer than War and Peace, but not by very many. Thank you all very much, and if I could wish everyone a very happy Christmas.

[Judge rises]

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Wednesday, 11 December 2019

And the winner is....?

And the winner is... in the red corner?
When the Post Office announced its settlement with the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance at 9am this morning, the expressions of relief and joy were something to behold.

"This is the best news I have ever heard," said one correspondent. "Still in disbelief that they would actually acknowledge let alone apologise for their behaviour."

"This has just given me the biggest lift!!!" emailed another.

For the hardened hacks calling round, the question boiled down to two words: "How much?"

No one on the claimants' side would tell me, which was a bad sign.

It was left to the Post Office press office to gleefully inform the great Karl Flinders from Computer Weekly they had settled for nearly £58m, all in.
Within five minutes of Karl posting his scoop on twitter I received a call from someone who knows a lot about this story. "I hope to Christ that figure is wrong," he said.

I called the Post Office press office to see exactly what the £58m settlement was meant to cover. A nice man called Karim told me as far as the Post Office were concerned it was everything. It was the final sum they have agreed to give the claimants to make them drop their action.

I asked Karim several versions of the same question in order to make sure and he was unequivocal. The £58m is not just to cover litigation costs and the funder's success fee. It is the final total sum that the claimants are going to get out of this litigation.

And I wouldn't be surprised if part of the settlement was an agreement never to raise a claim against the Post Office again.

There's no doubt £58m is a lot of money. But how far does it go?

Costs

It's fair to guesstimate the total amount the claimants have spent on getting this far is £22m. That's based on the assumption they are burning through cash at the same rate as the Post Office.

The Post Office's last two annual reports admit they have spent a total of £23m in the two years up to the end of March 2019.

It is reasonable to assume they have spent a further £5m this financial year on finishing the second trial, attempting to recuse the judge, attempting to appeal their failure to recuse the judge, attempting to appeal the first trial judgment, preparation for the third trial and mediation.

Part of the £23m already spent includes the £6m they were ordered to pay the claimants in costs for the first trial.

So if the claimants have been setting fire to £50 notes at the same rate, they have torched through £22m in legal fees to date, but have received £6m back already from the Post Office, making the outstanding total on the claimants' side £16m.

This outstanding sum will be taken out of the £58m, bringing the claimants' pot down to £42m.

But... the claimants' case was paid for by litigation funder Therium, which took a serious risk in paying for the claim. For taking that risk, they will be entitled to a fee. This, according to law.com, is how it works:

"Success fees are often expressed as a multiple of the investment, a percentage of damages, or the greater of the two. Terms vary significantly."

And securing a win in the High Court is hella tricky, as the "The Law Reviews" website notes:
"England and Wales, which is effectively London for these purposes, is the most expensive and the riskiest litigation market in the world."
For exposing themselves to a potential loss of at least £22m, Therium will want a big success fee. This could be 60% of the remainder of the pot. I suspect it will be much less, but let's say for the sake of argument it matches their outstanding costs - a return of £16m.

Which means the pot remaining for Subpostmasters is £42m - £16m = £26m.

Still a good chunk of cash, but when you divide it by the 552 claimants Subpostmasters you get an average of £47,101 each.

Obviously those who suffered and lost more will get more, those who suffered and lost less will get less. And, of course, my figures are guesstimates. The average per claimant could well be higher. It could also be lower.

Let's assume the very best - that the claimants' outstanding costs are no more than £10m and Therium only wants £5m on top of that, leaving £43m to the claimants. That's £78K each.

Hardly a life-changing sum. Shortly after the £58m figure had been released by the Post Office I received an email from a former Subpostmaster, who had obviously crunched the numbers himself. He concluded:
"This is nothing but a great win for the Post Office. My losses alone came to £200,000. This compensation will not cover the fraudulent claims that the Post Office took from me. I am 75 and still work to live and pay my mortgage. There will be no celebrating this decision."
It is possible, of course, that Karim was (unwittingly) passing on the wrong information. It wouldn't be the first time the Post Office press office has told journalists something which subsequently turns out to be untrue.

Maybe there are more sums which the claimants can unlock or access. I asked for clarity from the claimants' legal representatives Freeths, but came there none.

So why settle?

On 15 March, flushed by their stunning success at the first trial, James Hartley - a litigation partner at Freeths - said that if Bates v Post Office continued to go in the claimants' favour, the Post Office could end up paying "tens of millions or hundreds of millions of pounds" in damages.

And he was right. But given the settlement offer appears to be at the lower end of his estimate, why bite?

It could be that Therium saw the opportunity to double its investment and run. Plausible and understandable. It might be that Alan Bates looked into the whites of Nick Read's eyes and was smitten by his apparent willingness to accept the Post Office had been a bit naughty in the past, but was now willing to behave much better. Certainly the strength of the apology was mild and the acknowledgment of past wrongdoings was so vague as to be meaningless.

It might also be that Mr Read gave a number of other assurances. Before mediation, Alan Bates was very keen that Subpostmasters whose cases are before the Criminal Cases Review Commission would not get left behind. Maybe, as part of the settlement, the Post Office has agreed to suggest to the CCRC or the Court of Appeal that some or all of those convictions might be unsafe.

Who knows? I suspect more information will come out over the next few days, but right now, if I were a Post Office director, I would have a great big beaming smile on my face. And I'd be patting my team on the back for getting the press release out on a day when TV news editors were were only ever likely to take a fleeting interest.

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It's all over - parties agree a resolution through mediation



The Post Office has settled the group litigation brought against it by Alan Bates and 550+ other Subpostmasters. It will give the claimants legal team £57,750,000. From this, legal fees will be taken, as will a success fee which will go to Therium, the claimants' litigation funder. The individual claimants will share the remainder.  At 9am this morning the claimant Subpostmasters and the Post Office issued the following statement:

"The Parties to the Group Litigation in Bates v Post Office are pleased to report that they have reached a comprehensive resolution to their long-running litigation in the High Court, following several days of respectful, challenging, and ultimately successful mediation during which the parties engaged with each other in good faith.

The Post Office would like to express its gratitude to claimants, and particularly those who attended the mediation in person to share their experiences with us, for holding us to account in circumstances where, in the past, we have fallen short and we apologise to those affected.

The Post Office is committed to applying the lessons it has learnt. Its new Chief Executive Officer, who joined in September and led this drive to a mediated resolution, is undertaking an ambitious and sustained programme of changes to the Post Office’s relationship with postmasters whose role we recognise as being core to our future success. We look forward to working in genuine partnership with postmasters to seize the opportunities ahead of us and to continue to serve communities across the country.

Post Office Chairman, Tim Parker, said:
“We are grateful to the claimants for taking part in this mediation and agreeing a settlement, bringing the Group Litigation to a close.  I am grateful to Nick Read for his important engagement in the mediation process.  We accept that, in the past, we got things wrong in our dealings with a number of postmasters and we look forward to moving ahead now, with our new CEO currently leading a major overhaul of our engagement and relationship with postmasters.”
Nick Read commented:
“I am very pleased we have been able to find a resolution to this longstanding dispute. Our business needs to take on board some important lessons about the way we work with postmasters, and I am determined that it will do so.

We are committed to a reset in our relationship with postmasters, placing them alongside our customers at the centre of our business. As we agree to close this difficult chapter, we look forward to continuing the hard work ahead of us in shaping a modern and dynamic Post Office, serving customers in a genuine commercial partnership with postmasters, for the benefit of communities across the UK.”
Alan Bates commented:
“The Steering Committee would like to thank Nick Read, the new CEO of Post Office, for his leadership, engagement and determination in helping to reach a settlement of this long running dispute.  During the mediation, it became clear that he intends to reset the relationship between the Post Office and its Subpostmasters and put in place new processes and support for them, as part of a wider programme of improvements.

It would seem that from the positive discussions with Post Office’s new CEO, Nick Read, that there is a genuine desire to move on from these legacy issues and learn lessons from the past.”
****************

James (now Lord) Arbuthnot, whilst MP for North East Hampshire, brought a considerable amount of parliamentary pressure on the Post Office in the years leading up to this litigation. He has responded to this morning's news, saying:
"I’m thankful to hear that mediation has finally been successful.  We couldn’t go on as we were, with many millions of pounds being squandered on fighting about something that should have been resolved much earlier.
We will all need to consider the detail of the results of the mediation to see what remains unresolved.  I do hope we are not (as has been all too usual in this saga) inhibited by gagging clauses.  Where does this leave, for example, the consideration by the Criminal Cases Review Commission?  How does it leave those who have been convicted of, or who were persuaded to plead guilty on the basis of incomplete or misleading evidence to, crimes such as false accounting or even fraud?  How are those sub-postmasters who are not parties to the litigation affected?  I shall look forward to the answers to these and many more questions as details begin to emerge.”
The parties first went into mediation on Wed 26 November. Two weeks later they have a settlement.

Back in August Alan Bates was wary of mediation, having sent a circular to fellow claimants and members of the Justice for Subpostmasters Alliance stating:

"There could well be an optimum time when attending mediation might be in the Group’s best interests. But it certainly isn’t before the Horizon judgment is released..."

Funny how things change. Mr Bates expressed his concerns thus:
"To start with, POL [Post Office Ltd] still refuses to accept it has done anything wrong, otherwise it wouldn’t have applied to the Court of Appeal to overturn the findings by the Court of the Common Issues judgment. To go to mediation immediately would mean we could find ourselves in the same position we were in at the end of the Initial Complaint Review and Mediation Scheme where, as a number of you will recall, POL turned up at mediation meetings, stated it had done nothing wrong and stated it was ‘all your fault’."
When I spoke to him about it Alan Bates was clear three things needed to be on the table for the claimants to even consider a settlement. They were:

a) realistic compensation (ie pots and pots of cash).
b) a proper apology.
c) a solution to the criminalised cohort of claimant Subpostmasters whose cases are being reviewed by the Criminal Cases Review Commission.

As you can see from the statement above, there has been an apology. Whether a more fulsome one will follow, or if that's it, who knows.

And as for points a) and c), it's time to start trying to find out...

In case anyone's wondering, the Horizon judgment will still be handed down at 2pm on Monday 16 December by the managing judge. That's about £10m worth of legal fees and a serious amount of time and brainpower expended by a capable judge on what is now something of a non-story. Such is life. Further thoughts and questions here.

Friday, 22 November 2019

Subpostmasters' stunning victory confirmed by Court of Appeal



Today Lord Justice Coulson closed the door on the Post Office's last attempt to wriggle out of its contractual responsibilities to its Subpostmasters describing its attitude as not that far removed from "a mid-Victorian factory-owner." Lord Coulson delivered a withering rejection of all 26 of the Post Office's purported Grounds of Appeal of the Common Issues trial judgment, complaining as he went:
"The Post Office ascribed various findings or conclusions to the judge which, on analysis, form no part of his judgment. As the judge himself noted when refusing permission to appeal even when concerned with findings that he did make, the Post Office takes such findings “either wholly out of context, mis-stated, or otherwise not correctly summarised.”"
Sir Peter Fraser's 15 March judgment against the Post Office was a landmark in this case, but whilst it was open to appeal, there was doubt the Post Office would have to be bound by it.

In just under 10,000 words Lord Coulson puts that doubt to bed. He dismisses every argument the Post Office puts forward, concluding:
"the trial and the subsequent judgment were manifestly ‘the first and last night of the show’. No judge will ever know more about this case generally, and the Common Issues specifically, than Fraser J."
The implications of this decision for the Post Office are costly. It is going to have to spend a lot of money changing its business practices, and more importantly, its culture.

Shortly after Lord Coulson's decision dropped, a serving Subpostmaster emailed me with an impressive piece of invective against the Post Office, railing that: "the sheer scale of their audacious disregard for their trading partners, the law and common decency means they must be held to account.”

The testimony from Subpostmasters down the years and the evidence uncovered during this litigation shows that behind the brand, truly shocking abuses were going on. Many of them came out in evidence and cross-examination during the first trial. Until Sir Peter's judgment came through, the Post Office refused to accept that, over an 18 year period, it had done anything wrong.

Today Lord Coulson said:
"The Post Office describes itself as ‘the nation’s most trusted brand’. Yet this application is founded on the premise that the nation’s most trusted brand was not obliged to treat their Subpostmasters with good faith and instead entitled to treat them in capricious or arbitrary ways which would not be unfamiliar to a mid-Victorian factory-owner."
The Post Office replied:
"We remain focused on the work we are doing to improve the ways in which we work with postmasters, which is of the utmost importance.  We have taken determined action at every level of the business to provide better support to the people operating the UK’s 11,500 Post Office branches."
It doesn't have much choice.  Despite engaging in what the Bates v Post Office managing judge Sir Peter Fraser called "extremely aggressive" and "attritional" litigation tactics - trying to get Sir Peter sacked, taking forever to disclose anything, ramping up costs and trying to mislead in court - the Post Office has so far lost everything in this litigation hands down.

Will there be mass disciplining of those responsible for its failures over 20 years? Will there be an internal inquiry? Will some new hands-across-the-water body be set up to try to work out how the hell it is going to maintain a functioning relationship with its Subpostmasters in the future?

Alan Bates, founder of the Justice for Subpostmaster's Alliance, and lead litigant in this case, said today the Post Office has "wasted good public money in defending the indefensible and it is about time that someone at a very senior level steps in to control this storm that Post Office finds itself in.”

No wonder the Post Office is desperate to settle. The claimants are now barreling towards a series of trials which will start to spell out exactly how much the Post Office is in for if it is found to be in breach of 550+ contracts.

Ron Warmington, whose company uncovered serious failings with the Post Office's practices way back in 2013, reacted to Lord Coulson's decision by saying:
"This is profound. The Post Office's entire business model will now have to be re-generated. Indeed, that’s what we, at Second Sight, told them more than six years ago!  They should have offered serious compensation all those years ago. Now it looks set to cost far more than the Post Office's net worth."
To any casual observer it has been patently obvious that the Post Office's practices in ruining and prosecuting so many Subpostmasters on the flimsiest evidence looked shaky. But it kept doing it despite a growing furore that went public 10 years ago and culminated in a BBC Panorama investigation in 2015. The Post Office kept threatening media outlets if they reported the story, and it tried to make sure that what one journalist called "one of the most widespread miscarriages of justice in the UK this century" stayed out of the news. Bearing in mind how little media attention there has been on this story - it worked.

James (now Lord) Arbuthnot, was the backbench MP for North East Hampshire who campaigned hard to get this story wider attention and who put pressure on the Post Office to deal properly with the evidence they seemed to be ignoring or failing to deal with. Today he said:
"If the Post Office nursed any delusion that its behaviour had been acceptable, ethical or even legal, that ought now to be shattered.  Their treatment of the Subpostmasters has been disgraceful from the beginning, but they have justified it to themselves by telling themselves they are protecting public money.  It is now clear that they have been doing quite the opposite. They are running up vast legal bills defending the utterly indefensible.  They must now stop doing that and must start negotiating in good faith - if they have it in them."
Let's see who's listening. Of course, this litigation could well have a sting in its tail - the judgment for the Horizon trial, in which Sir Peter Fraser conducted a deep dive into the guts of that infamous computer system, has been promised before 4 Dec. Sir Peter might decide Horizon is "robust", which you can bet the Post Office will seize on, as it has every right to do.

There are also the first two mediation dates coming up next week. Who knows what the Post Office will be prepared to do to settle the case? Who knows what the claimants will accept?

There are plenty more twists to come, but today the claimants took one more very big stride towards victory, and they have every right to be jubilant.

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Lord Coulson rejects Post Office application to appeal first trial judgment

Reasons:

Case No: A1/2019/1387/PTA

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM 
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE FRASER
HQ16X01238, HQ17X02637 AND HQ17X04248
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 22 November 2019
Before:

LORD JUSTICE COULSON

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between:


Bates and Ors
Claimant

- and -


Post Office Limited
Defendant

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Helen Davies QC, Gideon Cohen and Joanne Box (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills Llp) for the Claimants
Patrick Green QC, Henry Warwick, Ognjen Miletic and Reanne MacKenzie (instructed by Freeths Llp) for the Defendant


Hearing date: 12th November 2019
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgment on PTA


LORD JUSTICE COULSON : 
These are my Reasons for refusing PTA following an oral hearing on 12 November 2019. Although it is convenient to put those reasons in judgment form, this is not a judgment which can be cited in other cases and therefore has no neutral citation number.  
1.General
  1. There are a number of reasons which militate against granting the PO permission to appeal against Judgment 3 (Common Issues). Those should be shortly stated before I go on to deal with the individual grounds of appeal. They form the background against which the test of ‘realistic prospect of success’ must be applied in this case.
  2. The judgment followed a trial of 6 weeks in which the electronic bundle was vast. The core documents alone filled 60 lever arch files. There were 20 witnesses of fact who gave oral evidence. The judgment is 320 pages and 1122 paragraphs long. In relation to the Common Issues, in the words of Lewison LJ in Fage, the trial and the subsequent judgment were manifestly ‘the first and last night of the show’. No judge will ever know more about this case generally, and the Common Issues specifically, than Fraser J.
  3. Furthermore, any consideration of the application for permission to appeal must bear in mind the dangers of attempting to untangle one issue for the purposes of an appeal, and the unacceptable ‘island-hopping’ that might result. The oral hearing of the permission application demonstrated all too clearly the impossibility of this task: inevitably, consideration of one issue opened up another, and another, until the whole first instance trial ended up being re-fought. That is manifestly not in the interests of justice. 
  4. This is compounded by the inescapable conclusion that many (if not most) of the PO’s challenges are, when properly analysed, challenges to the findings of fact made by the judge or the inferences to be drawn from them. He heard extensive evidence about the background to these contracts, how they operated in practice, how the written terms differed from the expectations of reasonable persons, and the practical consequences of the problems with the Horizon computer system. Challenges to such findings of fact are not open to an appellant in the position of PO: see Fage UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 and Henderson v Foxworth [2014] UKSC 41. This represents a fundamental difficulty for the PO because even the judge’s conclusions of law (such as the formulation of the implied terms) are so entangled with his findings of fact that it is neither just nor practicable to endeavour to separate them out.
  5. Many of the PO’s difficulties now are self-inflicted. For example, as happened during the trial and on the application for permission to appeal both to the judge, and to this court, the PO has consistently put its arguments much too high. It made sweeping statements about the trial and the judgment which were demonstrably wrong. The PO ascribed various findings or conclusions to the judge which, on analysis, form no part of his judgment. As the judge himself noted when refusing permission to appeal, even when concerned with findings that he did make, the PO takes such findings “either wholly out of context, mis-stated, or otherwise not correctly summarised”. 
  6. In my view, the judge dealt comprehensively with why he refused permission to appeal in his separate judgment of 17 June 2019 which itself runs to 91 paragraphs. The PO have made their further application to this court without taking on board any of the points made by the judge in that judgment. With one or two minor exceptions, I agree with the judge’s detailed reasons for refusing this application for permission to appeal, and regard them as an answer to the renewed application to this court.
  7. Another aspect of the PO’s litigation strategy which works against them now is their desire to take every point, regardless of quality or consequences. That was regularly apparent during the trial, where the judge correctly labelled their approach as “attritional”. The same approach was still in evidence on the application for permission to appeal.
  8. The most obvious example is the PO’s anxiety to state what they do not like about a particular proposal from the SPMs or the consequential finding by the judge, without providing any practical alternative. Take the issue of implied terms. The PO accepted at trial that the written contracts (the SPMC and the NTC) were inadequate as they stood and that some terms had to be implied. But the PO’s proposed terms were pitched at such a high and general level that they were of no practical value. By contrast, the SPMs put forward 20 odd detailed terms for the judge’s consideration. The judge asked the PO to be more helpful: the PO’s pleaded response was a one-line assertion that the terms put forward by the SPMs were denied. Having refused to put forward the detail of their case on the implied terms at the appropriate time, the PO cannot seriously complain now because they do not like the detail of the implied terms found by the judge. 
  9. None of this engenders any confidence in the underlying merits or prospects of success of the PO’s application for permission to appeal.
  10. Contrary to the PO’s repeated argument, there is no “other compelling reason” to grant permission to appeal, beyond a consideration of the individual grounds which they raise. The fact that the judge’s findings may affect other contracts with SPMs has always been known: that is why this was designated group litigation in the first place. There is no greater or wider right to permission to appeal just because this is group litigation; indeed, from the point of view of practical justice for those waiting for the outcome of this application, and all the other sub-trials listed in front of Fraser J still to come, the opposite may well be the case. In any event, as the judge noted, the SPMC is of historical interest only, because it is no longer in use.
  11. Finally, just standing back for a moment, there is an underlying point of common sense or commercial reality which, in my view, runs through every part of this application for permission to appeal. The PO describes itself as ‘the nation’s most trusted brand’. Yet this application is founded on the premise that the nation’s most trusted brand was not obliged to treat their SPMs with good faith, and instead entitled to treat them in capricious or arbitrary ways which would not be unfamiliar to a mid-Victorian factory-owner (the PO’s right to terminate contracts arbitrarily, and the SPMs alleged strict liability to the PO for errors made by the PO’s own computer system, being just two of many examples). Given the unique relationship that the PO has with its SPMs, that position is a startling starting point for any consideration of these grounds of appeal.
  12. None of this is a criticism of Ms Davies QC who was not involved in the trial or the application for permission to appeal to the judge in May, and who argued the points at the oral application for PTA with real skill and tenacity. But because of all that had gone before, she always had something of an uphill struggle.
2.Common Issue 1: Implied Duty of Good Faith (Grounds 2(a), (b) & (c))
Ground 2(a) Relational Contracts
  1. The complaint is that the judge “erred in implying the good faith term automatically from the classification of the contracts as ‘relational’”. This point is repeated in paragraph 10 of the PO’s skeleton argument, where the word ‘automatically’ is rendered in bold.
  2. In my view, on any fair reading of the judgment, the judge did no such thing. He considered the circumstances of this case and found, for a variety of reasons, that the good faith duty should be implied into these contracts. Having reached that conclusion he said [711] that the contracts could “most usefully [be] termed ‘relational contracts’”. That was a pure point of categorisation; nothing substantive turns on it. At no point did he find that, because the contract could be described as ‘relational’, the good faith term somehow “automatically” had to be implied. 
  3. Ms Davies QC accepted that, despite its formulation in the grounds of appeal, the judge did not say this in terms. She argued that I should infer it from various paragraphs, scattered all around the judgment, such as [692], [705], [720], [738], and [1117]. But that is not what those paragraphs say, even when read in isolation, and it is plainly not what the judge found when reading his judgment as a whole.   
  4. The judge noted in his reasons for refusing permission to appeal, this repeated mischaracterisation of what he actually found seems to stem from “a failure by the PO to understand the concept of relational contracts”. I would agree with that. He was defining relational contracts for the purposes of this judgment only as a contract that included the duty of good faith. He was not referring to (indeed, it appears that he was endeavouring to avoid) the academic debate about that small sub-specie of relational contracts (as defined in the authorities) that might not carry with them the good faith obligation.
  5. So it is wrong to say that the judgment was contrary to the decision in Globe Motors. That case is authority for the proposition that the implication of the duty of good faith depends on the terms of the particular contract: that is precisely the extensive exercise which the judge carried out in the present case. 
  6. Accordingly there is no realistic prospect of success on Ground 2(a). 
Ground 2(b) Implication of the Duty of Good Faith
  1. The essential complaint under this head is that the judge was wrong to imply the good faith duty. In my view, this argument is not open to the PO on appeal and, even if it were, it has no realistic prospect of success. 
  2. It is not open to the PO because, having set out the law on what good faith is and the circumstances in which the duty might be implied into a contract, the judge then applied those principles to his findings of fact as to the nature, scope and extent of the contracts, how they operated in practice and the gulf between the written terms and the expectations of reasonable persons in the position of the PO and the SPMs. That led to his conclusions as to how and why it was appropriate, in these circumstances, for the implied duty to be implied into these contracts. 
  3. These detailed conclusions were therefore based (either wholly or in large part) on the judge’s findings of fact, which were themselves based on the mass of documentation and oral evidence that he heard. In the circumstances of this case, there is no basis on which those findings could or should be reopened. 
  4. Even if the argument were theoretically available to the PO, it has no realistic prospect of success. The judge dealt carefully with why the duty was implied in this case (see for example his analysis of the law from [705]-[727] and then his application of that to the facts at [728]-[738]). There were no arguable errors of law in that analysis. 
  5. Ms Davies QC said that the judge had failed to have regard to the test of necessity when implying the duty of good faith. This was in part based on a convoluted argument that, because the judge said that some of the detailed implied terms arose out of good faith as opposed to necessity, that must somehow mean that he had implied the good faith duty without having regard to the test of necessity.
  6. I do not accept that submission. First, it is quite plain on any reading of the judgment that the judge paid particular regard to necessity when considering the implication of the duty of good faith: as Mr Green QC put it, “the test of necessity was baked in" to the judge’s conclusions as to good faith. He took [748] as an example of where the judge used the importance of necessity to limit the scope of certain implied terms which the SPMs said arose because of the duty of good faith.
  7. Secondly, I consider that the PO’s argument is based on an unfair description of what the judge was trying to do. The judge made it plain that the vast majority of these implied terms (17 in total) arose because of the duty of good faith which, as I have said, he found on a proper application of the principles relating to necessity. From [743] onwards, he undertook a term-by-term analysis and concluded that some of these terms (10) were more reflective of good faith and others (7) were more reflective of necessity. He was not however saying that the 10 were somehow ‘unnecessary’. The terms that he identified separately as arising through necessity alone (3) were identified in that way so as to emphasise that they needed to be implied in any event. None of that supports the conclusion that the judge must have approached the good faith test without having regard to necessity.
  8. For completeness, I take three of the detailed points raised by the PO to explain why the PO has no realistic prospect of persuading this court that the duty of good faith should not have been implied.
  9. First, the PO raises an issue about whether these contracts were or were not ‘long term’. In my view, that was primarily a factual matter, determined by the judge on a consideration of the specific circumstances of the contracts between the PO and the SPMs. The judge having made those findings of fact, this court will not interfere with them. Similarly, in respect of the alleged difference between agreed and expected durations, that is i) caught up with the PO’s misunderstanding of the relevance or otherwise of ‘relational’ contracts and ii) again ignores the judge’s findings of fact. 
  10. Ms Davies QC complained that the judge had ignored those authorities which suggested that, if a contract was terminable on short notice, it might not be regarded as a long term contract. But the obvious answer to that, and the one that the judge identified [632] is that most contracts have such termination provisions and that what matters is the underlying nature of the duties and obligations that each party owed the other. Moreover, the judge found on the facts that it was always intended that the relationship between the PO and the SPM would be long term. That was a finding of fact which the PO cannot now seek to reverse. Ms Davies QC was driven to argue that the judge did not give appropriate weight to the termination provisions, but for the reasons that I have already given, questions of weight were entirely for the trial judge.
  11. Secondly, another of the PO’s arguments is that the parties had already agreed certain express and implied obligations and that, between them, these filled the gap into which any good faith duty would otherwise be implied. The judge carefully considered that argument and rejected it, finding that the spirit and objectives of the PO and the SPMs were not capable of being expressed exhaustively in the written contract. As I have already noted, the PO had expressly conceded that. The judge therefore found that there was room for the implied duty of good faith: see [75] and [728]-[738]. That was a conclusion he was entitled to reach on the facts, and the contrary argument has no realistic prospect of success. If the PO has been hampered in making its case on this point because of its refusal to engage with the detail at the trial (the point made at paragraph 8 above), that was a matter for them
  12. Thirdly, on the related argument that good faith was unnecessary because of the implied terms of the sort identified in Stirling v Maitland, I consider that argument to be hopeless. As the judge himself noted at [740] - [741], those terms deal with inhibition and prevention and fall far short of a duty of good faith.
  13. For these reasons, I do not consider that Ground 2(b) has any realistic prospect of success.
Ground 2(c) The Nature/Scope of the Good Faith Duty
  1. Here the complaint is that the judge was wrong to imply a ‘broad and onerous good faith term’ which went well beyond co-operation and a requirement for honesty. 
  2. I reject the suggestion that the judge’s finding led to the implication of a “broad and onerous” term. On the contrary, at [706] the judge’s finding was limited, namely a requirement that the parties “refrained from conduct which in the relevant context would be regarded as commercially unacceptable by reasonable and honest people”. The authorities stress the low hurdle that this represents: see Sheikh Al Nehayan v Kent, where this test was formulated specifically so as not to be a demanding obligation. If the PO regard that as ‘onerous’, they have fundamentally misunderstood the contractual obligations necessitated by the duty of good faith.
  3. During her oral submissions, Ms Davies QC said that the PO objected to the last sentence of [738] when the judge said that “transparency, co-operation, and trust and confidence are, in my judgment, implicit within the implied obligation of good faith.” She said that this went wider than the term in Sheikh Al Nehayan. I disagree. The judge was simply identifying some of the concepts which he considered to be important elements of the good faith obligation in practice. It would be a surprising thing if, in the twenty first century, the PO had an obligation of good faith, but was - for example - not required to be transparent.
  4. She also criticised [740] and the finding that even if the obligation of good faith were limited to cooperation (which the judge did not accept) the term of co-operation would be “wider than simply necessary cooperation”. Again, the judge was simply demonstrating the lack of utility inherent in the high-level obligations put forward by the PO, and the likely range of a good faith obligation in the real world.
  5. The PO’s original argument, that the duty of good faith was limited to a requirement for honesty (which argument was advanced as part of this ground of appeal) is wrong in law for the reasons set out by the judge at [705] - [710]. This involved his finding that one sentence in Chitty (which equated good faith with honesty, without more) was wrong: see [711].
  6. At the oral hearing of this application - when I asked her - Ms Davies QC properly agreed that the passage in Chitty was wrong. The equation which the editor seeks to make is clean contrary to the Yam Seng, where Leggatt J (as he then was) found that “not all bad faith conduct can be described as dishonest”. Although Ms Davies QC argued instead that the obligation of good faith was limited to ‘honest co-operation’, that seemed to me to be a purely semantic difference which did not address the practical reality of a duty of good faith in this context.
  7. For these reasons, Ground 2 (c) is rejected as being unarguable.
  8. Accordingly, Grounds 2(a)-(c) having each been rejected, it follows that the good faith duty – in the terms outlined by the judge - was implied into the SMPC and the NTC contracts. Much of the rest of the judgment, and this application for permission to appeal, is concerned with points of detail in consequence of that central – and on my analysis, unappealable - conclusion.
3 Common Issue 2: Implied Terms (Grounds 3 and 4)
Ground 3(a) Contracts Not Relational
  1. The complaint is a rehash of the argument that the contracts are not relational. I have pointed out the PO’s misunderstanding of this issue and rejected the substantive argument above. The judge was right to imply the duty of good faith. No additional point arises. Ground 3(a) therefore fails.
Ground 3(b) Terms Consequential Upon or Incidents of the Duty of Good Faith   
  1. The judge found seventeen implied terms as consequential upon or incidents of the duty of good faith. He did this as a result of a detailed analysis starting at [743] and running to [767]. On my reading of this part of the judgment, the implication arose as a result of a careful analysis, reflecting the judge’s findings of fact and the wider context of the contracts. This is not an exercise which readily admits of any review by this court. 
  2. It is in relation to this part of the application that a number of the PO’s difficulties, already averted to, coalesce. That is because:
    1. This analysis was based (at least in part) on the judge’s findings of fact, which cannot be reopened;

    1. This analysis was based on the detailed terms put forward by the SPMs, which exercise the PO refused to engage with.

  1. Many of the points now taken by Ms Davies QC related to the detail of those terms. But of course, that was the sort of response which the SPMs (and the judge) were anxious to get from the PO at the time of the trial, but which was not forthcoming. In my view, it is now much too late for those sorts of points to be taken.
  2. Ms Davies QC in her oral submissions suggested that the judge had not had regard to the guidance of the Supreme Court in Marks & Spencer in connection with implied terms. That is wrong: that guidance is front and centre in [743]. She also suggested that the judge failed to have regard to the express terms. I do not accept that point either. At [702], [721], and [738], the judge expressly undertook that exercise. As the judge put it, it all depended on the context. Moreover, on this point, I think Mr Green QC was right to say that at no time have the PO ever identified any relevant express term to which they say the judge failed to have regard when addressing these implied terms.
  3. The PO complains that a specific term can only be implied as an ‘incident’ of the duty of good faith if it follows logically from, and is necessary to give more specific content or expression to, the duty of good faith. They say these terms fall outside this rubric because the duty of good faith “should only prohibit conduct that necessarily involves a guilty mental state and/or guilty knowledge”: see paragraph 40 of the PO’s skeleton argument.
  4. I consider that submission to have no realistic prospect of success. No authority is provided for it. The use of the word “guilty” appears to be a throwback to the erroneous argument (dealt with above) that good faith is somehow limited to the concept of honesty. The law is plain, that good faith involves broader obligations of honesty, fair dealing, cooperation, trust, confidence and transparency. It is quite possible for a party to fail to comply with one or more of these obligations without having what the PO are pleased to call “a guilty mental state”. 
  5. Beyond that, the arguments now advanced endeavour to descend into the detail which the PO refused to grapple with at the time of the trial. There is nothing to suggest that the judge was wrong to find any of these implied terms and in my view, each of them is plausibly an “incident” of acting in good faith. That is very different to the situation in Mid-Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust, because there the implied terms cut across the express terms, whilst here the judge correctly found that the implied terms did no such thing.
  6. Permission to appeal on Ground 3(b) is therefore refused.
Ground 3(c) Not Incidents of Good Faith
  1. This appears to be a form of procedural point; that, notwithstanding the length of the judgment already, the judge should have gone through each term, one by one, to explain why each was ‘an incident’ of the duty of good faith. But the point is a bad one: I consider that that is exactly what the judge did in the lengthy passages starting at [743]. I therefore conclude that Ground 3(c) is unarguable.
Ground 4 Necessity
  1. Ground 4 requires a certain amount of unpacking but is largely repetitive of what has gone before. The judge found that even if he was wrong about good faith, 7 of the 17 terms were required in any event as a result of business necessity, together with a further 3 terms which would be implied by way of necessity in any event. I have already rejected the PO’s submission based on the rigid distinction they seek to suggest that the judge made, as between good faith and necessity (see paragraphs 23 - 25 above).
  2. Paragraphs 44 – 74 of the PO’s skeleton argument disclose no substantive allegation that the judge erred in applying the test of necessity in order to imply these terms. The judge followed the test and guidance in Marks and Spencer and applied it to the facts that he found. There is therefore nothing in Ground 4, and permission to appeal is refused. 
4 Common Issue 3: Discretions and Powers (Ground 5)
  1. The judge found that “the implied duty of good faith applies to the exercise by the PO of all of its contractual powers and discretions under both the SPMC and MTC” (subject to some relatively minor exceptions): see [768]. This was because the contracts were subject to a general duty of good faith [756 – 757]; the contracts were either relational ([911]) or, if they were not then, as per British Telecommunications PLC v Telefonica O2 UK Limited, a contractual discretion had “to be exercised consistently with its contractual purpose, and in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously”. The judge found that on the words used, and in accordance with the commercial purpose of the contract, certain powers and discretions enjoyed by PO were subject to the duty of good faith [911].
  2. On the face of it, those conclusions are unimpeachable. Again, the argument appears to be rooted in PO’s dislike of the “incidents” (ie the detail) of the duty of good faith. But it remains unarguable that, given the judge’s other findings, the discretions and powers available to the PO had to be exercised in accordance with the overriding duty of good faith. That is what Telefonica says and both the judge and this court are bound by Telefonica in any event.
  3. One final point should be made about Ground 5, because of what I consider to be its ill-judged nature. The PO complain that the judge failed to tell them which of their powers and discretions were fettered by the implied terms. The short answer is plain: all of the discretions/powers were affected by the implied terms.
  4. But in any event, this is a wholly misconceived criticism from a party who failed to provide any sort of detail of their case (even in the alternative) at trial and seems to be content to set the SPMs (and the judge) one set of exam questions and then, when they have received answers to those that they do not like, ask a series of further questions which they had never raised before. The judge had done more than he was required to do to furnish detailed answers to the issues between the parties; he was entitled to expect the PO to take on board and act upon his detailed findings without having to provide yet further fine-slicing of the possible permutations.
  5. For all these reasons, therefore, I consider that Ground 5 is hopeless.
Common Issue 16: Termination on Notice of the SPMC and the NTC (Grounds 6 and 7)
  1. The PO’s complaint is that, contrary to the judge’s findings, the use of the words “not less than 3 months’ notice” (Ground 6, for the SPMC) and “not less than 6 months’ notice” (Ground 7, for the NTC) did not create a contractual discretion as to the notice period which had to be exercised by the PO in good faith. 
  2. I consider that these Grounds have to be considered in context. Later in his judgment at [911], when the judge is addressing an alternative way in which the SPMs were arguing that these notice periods were ineffective, the judge said this:
“911.  It is in relation to this part of the case that a light is shone on the way in which the Post Office is contesting parts of this litigation. One of the areas of dispute in this Common Issue is whether the Post Office is entitled to terminate the appointment of a SPM vindictively, capriciously or arbitrarily. That is denied by the Post Office; in other words, the Post Office argues that contractually it is entitled to act in this way. Although that is a surprising position, in my judgment it is also an obviously incorrect position. I have dealt already in this judgment with why that is so. Firstly, these contracts are relational contracts. Secondly, as stated by Lord Sumption JSC in British Telecommunications plc v Telefónica O2 UK Ltd [2014] UKSC 42 at [37], absence very clear words to the contrary, a contractual discretion has to be exercised consistently with its contractual purpose, and in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Thirdly, I have considered as a matter of construction the termination on notice provisions in both the SPMC and the NTC, and concluded on the words used, considered within the contracts at a whole and in accordance with their commercial purpose, how the power to terminate on notice should be exercised.“
  1. This passage is illuminating for two reasons. First, it shows that it is impossible to separate out individual issues in the way in which the PO now seek to do. Secondly, the passage shows that, underlying the specific points of law relied on by the PO is a deeply unmeritorious position which no judge would willingly countenance. That cannot be ignored when looking at these individual Grounds
  2. There is a further point. Even if I thought Grounds 6 and 7 in isolation had a realistic prospect of success, there would be no point in granting permission unless I also felt that their grounds in respect of the alternative cases as to true agreement (Ground 9); incorporation (Grounds 14-15); and UCTA (Grounds 16-20) also had a realistic prospect of success. If not, these points are of academic interest only
  3. Returning to the Grounds themselves, as a matter of construction, the PO says that “not less than” means a minimum period, and that termination which gives more than 3- or 6-months notice must automatically be lawful. The PO argue that the judge was wrong to say that the good faith obligation was relevant to this provision, and rely on the decision in Ilkerler Otomotiv (which was not an authority on which the PO relied at the Common Issues trial). But neither this, nor any of the other authorities on which they rely, deals directly with the words ‘not less than’.
  4. This argument is better than all the others advanced by the PO. But there is much force in Mr Green QC’s contrary suggestion that “not less than” has to be construed in the context of the contract overall, and there was striking evidence from both sides that nobody thought these termination provisions would ever be utilised. 
  5. Secondly, the PO says that the duty of good faith does not affect this issue, because good faith goes to performance of the contract, and there is authority (including Monde Petroleum) to support the suggestion that performance would exclude termination. Mr Green QC argued in response that Leggatt J in MSC said that termination would be included in a consideration of performance. It seems to me that whether termination is properly regarded as part of performance is not something which is capable of a black and white answer: it will again depend on the contract overall. That is how the judge approached it. 
  6. For those reasons, I have concluded that, although these individual Grounds are stronger than the rest, in all the circumstances of the case, they cannot be said to have a realistic prospect of success. Moreover, if I was wrong about that, I am confident that nothing will turn on it since, even if I had given permission to appeal on Grounds 6 and 7, I would still have to give permission to appeal on Grounds 9, 14-15 and 16-20 for the points to go anywhere, and, for the reasons set out below, I do not do so. 
6 Common Issue 15 Termination For Cause (Ground 8)
  1. Here the complaint is that the judge construed the word “material” as meaning, in all the circumstances of this contract, “repudiatory”. It is said that this is contrary to a number of authorities.
  2. Of course, there will be other contracts (and therefore other cases) where “material” is found to mean something different, but what matters here is the particular circumstances of these contracts (with their implied duty of good faith). The judge explained in detail (see in particular [907]) why he construed the word in the way that he did. 
  3. Furthermore, this was not an easy provision to construe. The word ‘material’ only arises in some of the sub-clauses and not in others. Thus clause 16.2.16, which contains no such qualification, would, as Mr Green QC submitted, allow termination if the SPM was one penny out and/or paid it one day late. On any view that is nonsensical. The judge embarked on a detailed investigation into the scope of the contract documents, which were far from being an average commercial arrangement. He reached the conclusion that he did after a careful analysis. There is no prospect of successfully persuading this court that his analysis was wrong in law.
  4. Finally, I should note that the PO have ascribed greater significance to this issue than it warrants because they may have again misunderstood the judgment: see [45] of the judge’s reasons for refusing permission to appeal. I agree with his observations on this issue.
  5. Accordingly, I consider that there is no realistic prospect of success on Ground 8. 
7 Common Issues 17 and 18 The ‘True Agreement’ Principle (Grounds 9 and 10)
  1. These grounds are advanced on the basis that, if the judge was wrong about the implication of good faith, he indicated in the alternative that the ‘true agreement’ principle (as explained by the Supreme Court in Autoclenz) arose and applied to (and negated) the 3/6 months periods of notice (Ground 9) and possibly other elements of the termination provisions (Ground 10).
  2. These are odd grounds of appeal. The judge dealt with this argument briefly at [909] – [926]. Moreover, when he came to answer the Common Issues at [1122], he did not answer Common Issues 17 and 18 at all, because he said they did not arise. It is therefore curious that the PO seeks permission to appeal in respect of findings that the judge did not make. That is particularly true of the tentative terms in which Ground 10 is put. There can be no basis for an appeal in respect of Ground 10 in any event since no contested findings are identified.
  3. Ground 9 is different because it goes to a potentially material issue: it is plain that the judge had in mind that, even if he was wrong in all the ways identified at [911] (paragraph 58 above), the 3 months/6 months periods of termination would not arise in any event. But, since I have not given permission to appeal on those Grounds, the issue is of tangential relevance.
  4. But in any event, it seems to me that the judge’s analysis by reference to Autoclenz was open to him in the particular (and unusual) circumstances of this case, and he was entitled to come to the conclusions he did. Again I repeat that the judge undertook a detailed analysis of fact; the judge knew how and why these termination provisions of 3/6 months were unrealistic and outside the expectations of reasonable parties. In those circumstances, should it ever come to it, I consider that there is no realistic prospect of this court overturning the judge’s application of the ‘true agreement’ principle, which was only another way in which he prevented arbitrary termination by the PO. 
  5. Accordingly, I refuse permission to appeal on Grounds 9 and 10. 
8 Common Issue 14: Suspension (Grounds 11, 12 and 13) 
Grounds 11 and 12 Suspension
  1. The original complaint was that the judge’s conclusions meant that the PO did not have the power to suspend at all. That again is wrong; another sweeping and incorrect statement based on the failure to understand the judgment, as noted at [51]-[57] of the judge’s reasons for refusing permission to appeal.
  2. The alternative complaint is that the judge erred in finding that a decision by the PO to suspend had to be ‘necessary’; had to be in accordance with the implied duty of good faith; and had to be the proper exercise of a contractual discretion. Ground 11 takes this point in respect of the SPMC; Ground 12 is in respect of the NTC.
  3. These submissions only have to be articulated for their unrealistic nature to be revealed.  It is surprising that the PO continues to argue that it could suspend the SPMs under these contracts even if that was unnecessary or if they were not acting in good faith or even if they were themselves in breach. No basis in law or fact for any of those submissions is made out in the PO’s skeleton argument. 
  4. The judge was asked to find the circumstances/basis on which the PO was entitled to suspend. He carefully took into account the various relevant factors and said that the suspension had to be in accordance with the legitimate interests of the PO. The judge reached that conclusion for three reasons: because it was a proper construction of the words used; because it was in accordance with the implied term of good faith; and because it was necessary to give the contract business efficacy.
  5. The judge only had to be right on one of those reasons in order for Grounds 11 and 12 to fail. In my view he was right on all three. These were common sense conclusions, based on his other findings, which seem to me to be unimpeachable. Indeed, it is difficult to see precisely how the PO suggests otherwise. Again, they do not put forward their own formulation. That is simply not a proper basis on which to seek permission to appeal. 
  6. To the extent that it is argued that Mid-Essex Services NHS Trust was authority for the proposition that a contractual right to suspend should be deemed non-discretionary but absolute, that submission is rejected. That is not what Mid-Essex says at all. Furthermore, it has nothing to do with the narrow point in issue here, mainly whether the interests should be qualified by the word “legitimate”. Since that was the only qualification that the judge found, there is nothing in this point. 
Ground 13 The PO’s Own Breach
  1. It is also suggested that the judge erred in concluding that the PO could not suspend when it was itself in material breach. That argument is untenable: the judge’s finding follows from earlier parts of his judgment, in particular his conclusion that suspension could only be in furtherance of the PO’s legitimate interest.
  2. For these reasons, I consider that Grounds 11, 12 and 13 are unarguable and I refuse permission to appeal on those grounds. 
9 Common Issues 5 and 6: Incorporation (Grounds 14 and 15)
  1. The context for Common Issues 5 and 6 is this: if the terms are onerous and unusual, and they have not been brought to the attention of the SPMs before entering into the contract, then they are not incorporated at all (so the UCTA analysis is not even triggered).
Ground 15 Notice
  1. It appears that Ground 15 is aimed at the question of whether or not it could be argued that the terms were brought to the SPM’s attention merely because they were in the written contracts (see paragraph 119 of the PO’s skeleton argument). That of course is a challenge to the judge’s careful detailed findings of fact as to notice and therefore not a matter on which, in all the circumstances of this case, can now be considered by this court.
Ground 14 Onerous and Unusual Terms
  1. That leaves the question of whether or not the five terms identified in Ground 14 were onerous and unusual terms. The judge reached conclusions as to how and why the clauses in question were onerous and unusual. Those were mixed findings of fact and law. It is not suggested that the judge made any errors in respect of the principles to be applied. Moreover, his application of those principles is clear and, in my view, correct.
  2. Dealing with each briefly:
  1. The judge concluded at [1007] – [1010] that the terms at paragraph 4.1 and 13.1 of Part 2 were onerous and unusual because, without any fault on the part of the SPM, they rendered the SPM liable for potentially sizable sums with no upper limit, for something entirely out of their control. That finding was therefore justified.
  2. For the reasons set out at [1023] – [1025], the judge found that clauses 5 and 6 of Section 19 of the SPMC and paragraphs 15.2 and 15.3 of Part 2 of the NTC were onerous and unusual because, although the Post Office would not pay the SPM during a period of suspension, the branch Post Office would have to remain open and be operating. In addition, even if the SPM was reinstated, the PO was entitled not to pay for any period of the suspension. Again, I consider that that was plainly an onerous and unusual term.
  3. For the reasons summarised at [1035] the judge concluded that assuming he was wrong on his other findings, paragraph 16.1 of Part 2 of the NTC would be onerous and unusual if the permitted termination for anything other than a repudiatory breach. That is consistent with the judge’s other findings in respect of which there is no prospect of successfully arguing to the contrary.  Nothing therefore remains in this complaint.    
  4. For the reasons summarised at [1036] – [1040] the judge found that, if he was wrong on his other findings, and if the PO could terminate on 3 months notice without justification (the period under the SPMC), that would be onerous and unusual. He explains why. He contrasts that with the 6 months under the NTC, where the notice could not be given during the first year of appointment. He found that that was not onerous and unusual. Accordingly, the findings in relation to the termination on notice provisions in the SPMC were careful and consistent with the judge’s other findings. There is no basis for allowing permission to appeal.
  5. For the reasons summarised in [1041] – [1045] the judge held that clause 8 of Section 1 of the SPMC and paragraph 17.11 of Part 2 of the NTC (providing that an SPM is not entitled to compensation if this contract was terminated) were onerous and unusual. The judge noted at [1044] that it could not be right that an SPM who had worked hard and built up the business would have no compensation, a fact that he expressly found to have been recognised by the PO in terms of how it behaved in practice. This again links back to his findings of fact. There is again no basis for this ground of appeal.
  1. Accordingly, I consider that there is no realistic prospect of successfully arguing any of Grounds14(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e).
  2. I emphasise that Ground 14(d) went to termination on notice. Since I have concluded there is no prospect of success on this appeal, it renders immaterial whether or not I would have granted permission on Ground 6, because - in relation to the SPMC anyway - the argument would fail at this hurdle in any event.
10 Common Issue 7, 19 and 20: Substantially Different Performance /Reasonableness (Grounds 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20)
  1. This is the core of the UCTA analysis, being concerned with whether or not the contracts were on the PO’s standard terms of business and whether the terms allowed the PO to render a performance that was substantially different from that which was reasonably expected of it or indeed no performance at all; and then finally whether particular terms were unreasonable. 
Ground 16 Standard Terms of Business
  1. The argument is that the judge was wrong to find that the SPMC and the NTC were the PO’s written standard terms of business. Ms Davies QC submitted that the PO’s business was the supply of post office services to the public, not the employment of SPMs. That argument had already been advanced before, and roundly rejected by, the judge. It is not difficult to see why.  
  2. First, this was par excellence a finding of fact that the judge was entitled to make. But secondly the PO’s argument is premised on the assumption that the PO does or is only capable of doing one type of business. That is plainly incorrect. In the present circumstances, it operates its business in two ways: it provides a service to the public but it also runs a national network of sub-post offices. That second element of the business depends entirely on the contracts between the PO and the SPMs. Accordingly, the terms of those contracts are within UCTA because they are the PO’s standard terms of business.
  3. Permission to appeal is therefore refused on Ground 16.
Ground 17 Substantially Different Performance
  1. The complaint is that the judge was wrong to find that, in the ways analysed by the judge, the terms in question allowed the PO to render a substantially different performance to that which might reasonably have been expected.
  2. I conclude that the judge was entitled to reach the conclusion that the terms allowed the PO to render a contractual performance that was “substantial and different” from that which was reasonably expected of it. The analysis at [1081]- [1084] is conventional and clear.
  3. Moreover, I do not consider that any parts of paragraphs 126 – 129 of the PO’s skeleton to disclose any error of law on the part of the judge. The fact-sensitivity and case-specificity of these matters is in any event encapsulated in the passage from the judgement of Stanley Burnton LJ in AXA Sun Life Services, quoted at paragraph 128 of the PO’s skeleton argument.
  4. A separate point was raised by the PO as to whether the judge was right to find, in the alternative, that these provisions allowed the PO to render no performance at all. I do not accept that criticism. By way of example, an alleged requirement that the SPM  had to maintain access to his branch whilst he is suspended, and not entitled to be paid during the same time, is a situation where the PO would be rendering no performance at all.
  5. Finally on this point, I note that in the case of Lalji, this court was dealing with the application of the UCTA to these very contracts. It must therefore have been agreed that the terms of the contract entitled the PO to render a contractual performance substantially different from that which was expected and/or no performance at all: otherwise UCTA would have had no application.
Ground 18 Reasonableness
  1. The judge explains how and why particular terms failed the test of reasonableness. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, these are (with one important addition) the same terms which the judge found to be onerous and unusual under Common Issues 5 and 6. Again no error of law is disclosed. Again those were findings of fact he was plainly entitled to reach, as per George Mitchell v Finney Lock. I therefore reject Grounds 18(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) (reflecting as that does my conclusions in relation to Ground 14, and paragraph 86 above in particular).
  2. The addition is that the judge found that the notice provisions in both the SPMC and the NTC were unreasonable (having found that it was only the 3 months in the SPMC that was onerous and unusual). He explains at [1107(4)] why each was unreasonable and there is no realistic prospect of this court reaching a different view.
  3. Again, because this includes the termination on notice provision (Ground 18(d)) it means that, even if I had been tempted to grant permission to appeal on Grounds 6 and 7, there would have been no point in doing so, because there is no prospect of the PO successfully overturning this finding of unreasonableness.
Grounds 19 and 20 Particular findings re UCTA
  1. These are not separate points but a summation of what has gone before: that because the terms allow a substantially different performance and are unreasonable, UCTA applies. That of course is all in the alternative to the inclusion of the terms in their amended form (ie following the implication of the good faith duty and/or the implications for business efficacy). For the reasons I have already explained, the judge was entitled to reach the conclusions that he did. The application for permission to appeal on Grounds 19 and 20 is therefore rejected.
Common Issues 12 and 13 Agency (Grounds 21 – 24)
  1. Two general points should be made. First, it should be noted that the PO’s appeal on agency must be treated with considerable caution, because of its constantly-changing nature, as recorded in the substantive judgment and summarised at [30] of the judge’s reasons for refusing permission to appeal.
  2. Secondly, all of these agency points were taken by the PO in an attempt to render the SPMs liable for any errors in the Branch Trading Statements (BTS) even if the SPM had registered an objection to the BTS or complained to the Helpline about it. This was an extreme position to adopt and one that cannot be hidden behind alleged “ordinary principles” of agency law.
  3. The judge undertook a detailed analysis of precisely how the BTS worked, how they were made up, and how protests or complaints about them might be registered. That exercise was vital in informing his analysis of the so-called agency argument. Again, this court will not interfere with those findings of fact.
Ground 21: Normal Principles of Agency Law (Accounts)
  1. The complaint is that the judge “somehow excluded” what are called “normal common law principles applicable to agents”. Both parts of this assertion are wrong. 
  2. The judge carefully considered the law and principles of agency and how they related to the relationship between the PO and the SPMs: see the lengthy passages from [782] to [864] and Appendix 4. The law makes clear that the nature of any specific agency relationship has to be decided on the particular facts, taking into account the whole contract and all the surrounding circumstances, including the conduct of the parties. Labels in the contract are not determinative. That is exactly how the judge approached these issues.
  3. The judge carried out a comprehensive analysis. No error of law is disclosed in his approach: he did not ‘exclude’ any applicable principle of law. His findings of fact are inviolable. The BTS was, as Mr Green QC submitted, about as far removed from any ordinary ‘settled account’ in an agency situation as it is possible to get. It was not a document over which the SPM had any control. There is therefore no realistic prospect of successfully arguing Ground 21 and it is rejected.
Ground 22  BTS
  1. As already noted, the PO were taking (and maintain) the point that, if there had been no objection to any part of a BTS which had not been the subject of a notified dispute, that meant that the BTS was a settled account (as might arise in a conventional agency relationship), and could not now be challenged. In this way the SPM was stuck with the effects of the contents of a document over which he/she had no control. The judge rightly rejected that argument as a matter of law, based on his detailed assessment of the facts. There is no realistic prospect of a successful appeal on that point.
  2. Ground 22 is therefore rejected. 
Ground 23 Helpline
  1. The judge also found [823] that an SPM could discharge the burden of showing that the BTS was incorrect by demonstrating that he or she had contacted the Helpline during the relevant period. That was a finding of fact which cannot be challenged. It was also a pragmatic solution to the extreme case being advanced by the PO, and I consider the contrary to be unarguable.
Ground 24 False Statements
  1. The judge’s conclusions as to presumptions of fact was the product of a lengthy consideration of the factual background. It is consistent with, and the logical consequence of, his other findings. There is no realistic prospect that the Court of Appeal would interfere with it. Ground 24 is therefore rejected.
12 Common Issue 8: Liability Of SPMs For Losses (Grounds 25 and 26)
Ground 25 Construction of Section 12 Clause 12
  1. The clause is set out at [643] and stated: 
“The sub post master is responsible for all loses caused through his own negligence, carelessness or error, and also for loses of all kinds caused by his Assistants…”
  1. The judge found at [464] – [467] that this provision meant that the PO had to prove negligence, carelessness or error on the part of the SPM in order to render an SPM liable for “losses”. In my view, that is the only possible interpretation of these words. I find the PO’s challenge to this, set out at paragraphs 159 – 167 of the PO’s skeleton argument, to be fanciful and wholly unpersuasive.
  2. Moreover, I note that at trial the PO accepted that “if you allege there is a loss you need to show it”. On that basis, it is unrealistic for the PO now to argue that in some way the judge was wrong to place the burden of proving any losses on them in the way in which the clause envisages. 
  3. It appears that the PO had (and perhaps still has) some convoluted case that Horizon-generated shortfalls might give rise to a different burden of proof. There is a hint of this in paragraph 165 of the PO’s skeleton. There is no basis for any such distinction, either in the clause, or on the law, or on the facts. The judge summarised why the argument was hopeless at [34] – [37] of his reasons for refusing permission to appeal. In my view, the argument was (and remains) untenable.
Ground 26 Assistants
  1. The complaint here is that the judge erred in construing the clause as imposing a need for negligence, carelessness or error on the SPM “or their assistants”. The argument appears to be that in some way any loss traceable back to an assistant created a strict liability on the part of the SPM, without the need for the PO to show negligence, carelessness or error. In other words, an act or omission of a third party (the assistant) put the SPM in a worse position than if the SPM had done (or failed to do) the act himself/herself.
  2. Again, like the judge, I consider that to be unarguable. The clause clearly envisages that the negligence, carelessness or error will be on the part of the SPM or his or her assistants. That is in accordance with ordinary principles concerned with the burden of proof in any event. 
  3. There is no basis in the clause, or anywhere else, for the SPM to assume strict liability for the acts or omissions of the assistants. Ground 26 of the grounds of appeal must also fail.
  4. For these reasons, having carefully considered the papers and the parties’ submissions at the hearing on 12 November 2019, the PO’s application for PTA is rejected.