Tuesday, 24 December 2019

Paula Vennells apologises for the first time

Paula Vennells
Quite a scoop from the Daily Mail - two days after telling the newspaper she would not apologise to Subpostmasters, former Post Office CEO Paula Vennells has changed her mind.

In a statement to the Daily Mail, Ms Vennells says:

"It was and remains a source of great regret to me that these colleagues and their families were affected over so many years. I am truly sorry we were unable to find both a solution and a resolution outside of litigation and for the distress this caused."

Read the full story here. Tom Witherow has done some excellent reporting.

Read the charge sheet against Paula Vennells I wrote up the week she announced her departure from the Post Office back in February this year. This was before the first trial judgment landed.

The Sunday Times wrote a thorough shredding of Ms Vennells approach to the whole saga a couple of days ago. Read it here (££).

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.


Choose an amount

Friday, 20 December 2019

NFSP crawls out from under its rock

Comedy clown car Subpostmaster representative organisation, the National Federation of Subpostmasters, has finally, in a statement to its members, said it thinks Horizon isn't all that.

The NFSP is wholly complicit in the Horizon scandal. It threw its own members under a bus, as policy, in order to protect the Post Office brand. And now, in a cynical and desperate move, it has turned on the Post Office in order to justify its existence.

Let us be clear. The NFSP is a department of the Post Office. The NFSP exists because it is funded by the Post Office. It does not receive membership subscriptions. The Post Office gives it money. Lots of it. Every year.

I have tried, throughout my interest in this story, to be as objective and fair as possible to all parties. It is difficult to ignore things which are both obvious and happening before your eyes, but you need to ask if there might be one or more less obvious, alternative explanations. With or without hard evidence (which I have been lucky enough to stumble across over the last nine years), you still need to contextualise, provide balance, ask questions and seek answers.

I firmly believe that as a result of this litigation, and the judge's conclusions, those Subpostmasters who are on the take are likely to find thieving from the Post Office so much easier than before.

But because the Post Office assumed guilt in innocent people, went after them until they were utterly crushed, it has completely ****ed up its entire business model.

The Post Office is now in a situation whereby it is having to pay compensation to innocent people yet has no clear way of stopping criminal Subpostmasters (of the 9,000-odd out there - there might be a few) defrauding the system.

The chickens are coming home to roost.

I will give credit to the Post Office. It did bad things, it sent threatening legal letters to journalists trying to hold it to account, but it was only ever trying to protect its own (ultimately indefensible) position.

But the NFSP... this is an organisation which supposedly exists purely to help Subpostmasters.

The NFSP should have been looking out for its members from the off, but didn't. I wrote about this before the first trial judgment.

That judgment utterly destroyed the NFSP's credibility. And now the NFSP comes crawling towards the moral high ground like some sort of rotting, zombified Uriah Heep, wringing its hands and bleating that it has been wronged.

Have a read of what the NFSP Chief Executive, Calum Greenhow, had to say in a circular sent to members yesterday:
"The NFSP has taken the time since Monday to read and reflect on the judgment, how it relates to the first ‘Common Issues’ trial judgment (delivered in March 2019), and what the implications are for the network and the Post Office. 
"The Post Office prides itself as being the most trusted brand on the High Street. The verdicts issued by Justice Fraser challenge that perception....The NFSP is therefore extremely disappointed by the Post Office's behaviour in light of the verdict that the Horizon system was not fit for purpose until very recently. 
"By implication of this verdict, the Post Office has misled the NFSP for years about the reliability of the Horizon system."
The NFSP has been "misled" by the Post Office. For years. And the NFSP went along with it?

Worse, actually.

On 3 Feb 2015, the NFSP's then General Secretary George Thomson told MPs during a select committee inquiry without offering any evidence:

"Over the 15 years, the Horizon system has been fantastically robust." and Horizon had been "a very strong system from day one."

On the subject of IT errors, Thomson dismissed them, saying: "Sub-postmasters sometimes think that the problem has to be the Horizon system when in effect it was mistakes by members of staff or misappropriation."

and re the Post Office: "on Horizon, it has done nothing wrong."

This is not an organisation passively accepting the Post Office line. It is actively promoting a lie.

Take a look at the branch circular issued by the NFSP immediately after the August 2015 Panorama programme.


The NFSP states categorically to its members:
"the NFSP has not received calls from subpostmasters querying Horizon and alleging systemic failings. If there were a widespread problem, our subpostmasters would have made us aware of it. As a result we have no choice but to conclude that Horizon is a fundamentally sound and safe system." [my italics]
Not a single call from a Subpostmaster querying Horizon? Really?!

Not only was the NFSP failing to do anything - whilst presenting itself to MPs as an independent and objective organisation it was actively working against the interests of some of its most isolated and desperate members.

And the Post Office was quick to attempt to use this to its advantage in court. As Mr Justice Fraser says in the first trial judgment:
"the NFSP has publicly supported the Post Office’s view that Horizon is robust. The Post Office therefore relies upon this support by the NFSP to support its stance in this litigation."
Let's go back to yesterday's circular. Mr Greenhow states:
"As outlined by Justice Fraser, the NFSP raised concerns to the Post Office about problems our members have experienced with the system; repeatedly we were told that the system was robust, and that user error is the primary cause of problems."
There is evidence (which the Post Office tried to bury) that the NFSP had raised concerns about Horizon (despite the NFSP telling MPs and its members there were no concerns).

And in the above paragraph the NFSP tells its members it believed the Post Office. Because....?

The NFSP Chief Executive goes on:
"Clearly, a significant amount of work will be required to get the relationship between the Post Office and the network back on an even keel – and the NFSP will play a central role in this. You have my word that we will do everything possible to ensure a situation like this never happens again."
A central role? Everything possible? This is the NFSP, which a High Court judge ruled has "put its own interests and the funding of its future above the interests of its members" and "is not an organisation independent of the Post Office."

It's cretinous. And would be laughable were so many lives not ruined as a result of the NFSP's inaction.

The final paragraph of Mr Greenhow's circular demonstrates the paucity of the NFSP's scope as he states:
"any current or former Subpostmasters who believe they have been held responsible for losses within their post office business that were no fault of their own should contact NBSC on 03333 455567 or at ComplexCaseTeam@postoffice.co.uk to raise the issue."
Call the Post Office helpline. Don't call the NFSP. Goodness, no. Email or call the Post Office instead. What could possibly go wrong?

Way back in 2013 I had a conversation with a Private Eye journalist about the IT cock-up stories the Eye had covered throughout the 00s. I told him I was having difficulty trying to find whistleblowers who had worked with the Horizon system, and asked if he had been in touch with anyone from any other IT companies who had blown the whistle on what had gone wrong in the NHS, MOD or wherever.

The Eye hack said no - information had always come from the unions. The unions are the whistleblowers who act as a proxy for their individual members. They go to the media when it's obvious something bad is happening.

The NFSP, by contrast, has never publicly criticised or publicly raised questions about the Horizon system. It has, in fact, until yesterday, done the complete opposite

As a result, some of its members have been unnecessarily suspended, sacked, prosecuted, criminalised, mentally broken and financially ruined.

This scandal could have been avoided if the NFSP had listened to its Subpostmasters, rather than take assurances from the Post Office that there was nothing to see, or worry about.

I hope the NFSP execs reading this can sleep at night. They sold you a lie, lads. And you bought it. And you peddled it for them.

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.


Choose an amount

Wednesday, 18 December 2019

Second Sight's Ron Warmington breaks his silence

Ron Warmington
Ron Warmington is the managing director of Second Sight, the independent forensic accountants hired six years ago by the Post Office to look at its Horizon computer system and investigate Subpostmaster complaints.

Mr Warmington has not commented publicly about that experience, until now. Today he released a statement castigating the Post Office for its treatment of Subpostmasters and setting out his belief that cash in Post Office suspense accounts has been unfairly taken from the pockets of Subpostmasters and funnelled into Post Office profits.

According to Mr Warmington:
"the Post Office has improperly enriched itself, through the decades, with funds that have passed through its own suspense accounts. Had its own staff more diligently investigated in order to establish who were the rightful owners of those funds, they would have been returned to them, whether they were Post Office’s customers or its Subpostmasters.  When is the Post Office going to return the funds that, in effect, belonged to its Subpostmasters?"
He adds:
"It also seems to be clear now that some of those funds could have been generated by Horizon itself, or by errors made by the Post Office’s own staff, or by those of Fujitsu. They weren't "real" losses at all. They were phantom discrepancies."
Mr Warmington is a former CFO of Citibank’s Global Asset Management Business. He went on to run the firm's Global Fraud Investigation Department and head up Security in Europe, the Middle East & Africa. He then became Head of Fraud Management in GE’s EMEA regions before setting up Second Sight in 2010.

Second Sight's first report for the Post Office, published six years ago, found bugs in Horizon, and concluded: "had the Post Office investigated more of the "mysterious shortages" and problems reported to it [by its own Subpostmasters] with the thoroughness that it has investigated those reported to it by Second Sight, the Post Office would have been in a much better position to resolve the matters raised, and would also have benefited from process improvements."

Today Mr Warmington said:
"if the Post Office Board had believed - and acted on - what Second Sight reported... instead of being led by the nose by its own middle management and in-house and external legal advisors, huge amounts of money, and human suffering, would have been avoided." 
"As a fraud investigator who has, for decades, dealt with real fraudsters and confidence tricksters, it struck me, six years ago, as I interviewed Subpostmaster after Subpostmaster, that these are good, honest, straight-talking people. It was very rapidly obvious that many have suffered life-changing damage because they received no investigative support when mysterious shortfalls appeared in their accounts. 
"Some were left in limbo when the police refused to investigate, saying that Post Office’s own investigation department should carry out the work, and the latter said they wouldn’t investigate either."
Mediation scheme

After their initial investigation and report was published in 2013, Second Sight were retained to investigate individual Subpostmasters' cases during the Post Office's complaint and mediation scheme, which ran from August 2013 to May 2015. During this period Second Sight produced a number of reports which uncovered serious problems with the Post Office's processes and business model. Here are just two:
"As a result of our investigations we have established that Post Office’s investigators have, in many cases, failed to identify the underlying root causes of shortfalls prior to the initiation of civil recovery action or criminal proceedings."
and:
"Post Office generally insists on losses being made good, but the Subpostmaster is not necessarily entitled to receive all of the information and explanations necessary to establish the cause of the loss. We regard this as unfair."
These perceptive reports were ultimately borne out by Mr Justice Fraser over the course of the recently concluded litigation. At the time, the Post Office refused to accept or publish them, instead issuing counter-reports and more denials. Shortly before Second Sight's final report was circulated, the Post Office sacked them and terminated the mediation scheme.

Today Mr Warmington has put forward what he thinks should happen next, arguing that:
  • the CCRC must come to a conclusion quickly about referring cases of criminalised Subpostmasters to the Court of Appeal.
  • those Subpostmasters who have been wronged in the civil courts (such as Lee Castleton) need to be properly recompensed.
  • funds need to be found to supplement the meagre compensation available to claimants after costs and the litigation funder’s success fee has been taken out.
  • the Post Office needs to redesign its business plan and prepare new contracts with which to engage its agents (or franchisees) - the Subpostmasters. 
  • steps should be taken to reduce the abysmally High error rates that are endemic throughout the Post Office (apply Six Sigma or similar process improvements).
  • a completely new and trusted investigation department needs to be established - probably funded through a captive insurance company.
  • the Post Office’s right to bring prosecutions in the name of the Crown, bypassing the CPS, needs to be revoked, immediately. 
Mr Warmington concludes his broadside by saying:
"The Post Office’s profound readiness to distrust even its longest-serving Subpostmasters; to defend "the brand" at all costs; and to refuse even to consider the possibility that its own staff or its own core system could be at fault contrasted starkly with my decades of experience in high-integrity financial institutions.

"Properly trained investigators are always as enthusiastic at finding evidence of innocence as they are at finding evidence of guilt.  Until Post Office adopts that philosophy, nobody - and no civil or criminal court - should trust anything it asserts.” 
I have contacted the Post Office and Fujitsu, putting Mr Warmington's allegations to them. All Fujitsu will say about the matter is that they take Mr Justice Fraser's Horizon Issues trial judgment "very seriously" and they will now review his findings "in detail." The Post Office tell me they have nothing to add to their statements about the now-concluded litigation.

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.

Choose an amount

Tuesday, 17 December 2019

Fisking the Horizon trial 1: the meaning of "robust".

Would you like to read 2423 words on the meaning of the word "robust"?

Now you can, below.

It was a big deal in the Post Office Horizon trial because the Post Office contended that Horizon is robust whereas the claimants thought it was only relatively robust.  On such things trials are won and lost, so getting a working definition of robust together was one of the first things the judge did.

The segment below comprises paragraphs 36 - 56 of the Horizon Issues judgment.

Language scholars and engineers may enjoy it:

The meaning of “robustness”

Turning to the disagreement about Issue 3, given the parties disagreed about whether the Horizon system is (or was) “robust”, it is a fairly elementary step to consider the meaning of that term, and how it is being used by the parties. Context is important so far as the meaning of the word “robust” is concerned. If someone is in robust health, it usually is taken to mean that they are healthy, or even very healthy. A robust exchange of views can be a polite way of referring to an argument. Given the importance of the concept to the Horizon system, its prominence in the Post Office’s defence of the system, and its express inclusion (admittedly in inverted commas) in the Horizon Issues, I asked each side in the litigation during oral closing submissions for a reference from their pleadings or submissions for the meaning which they ascribed to the word. I referred to this as their benchmark definition. Robustness was referred to by both sides in the litigation in numerous places, but not always in the same precise terms, and clarity is to be welcomed.

The claimants answered this by reference to the remainder of Issue 3, namely “extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches” and explained that the claimants had found the word robust “difficult to define” other than by reference to this. This would mean therefore that it had no separate independent meaning other than as a summary of the longer second part of Issue 3. In other words, a robust system would be one that is extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches. The claimants also implicitly, if not expressly, criticised use of the term both by the Post Office in its pleadings and written submissions as being more aligned to public relations than as a performance standard.

The Post Office asked for some time to provide the reference that I requested. Given the meaning of “robust” is so central in the Post Office’s defence of the Horizon system, I granted the Post Office the time that was requested.

The Post Office subsequently, after the trial ended, submitted a short document entitled “the Post Office’s case on the meaning of robustness”. This was not what was intended when I sought a reference from the Post Office to their definition, and the document submitted went rather further and made wider ranging submissions. The document did state, so far as the meaning of the word is concerned, the following:
“In Post Office’s submission, the meaning of robustness is a matter for expert opinion. Robustness is a well-established concept in the IT industry and is the subject of academic study: see para. 361 of Post Office’s written closing”.

I do not consider that the meaning of words is a matter for expert opinion. The two experts in this case are IT experts, not experts in linguistics or the meaning of language. However, the meaning of robustness within the field of IT is, arguably, a matter upon which the experts’ opinions should be considered, not least because they were applying that term to their expert exercise. The Post Office also relied upon the 1st Experts’ Joint Statement which in respect of Issue 3 stated the following as agreed:

“There are different dimensions of robustness, such as robustness against hardware failure, software defects and user error. The robustness of the system also depends on the processes around it.

Robustness does not mean perfection; but that the consequences of imperfection must be managed appropriately. If the extent of imperfection is too high, this would be very difficult to do which would imply less robustness.

Horizon has evolved since its inception. Therefore, its robustness may have varied throughout its lifetime. The level of robustness may have increased or decreased as the system was changed.

The existence of branch shortfalls is agreed. The experts do not agree at this point as to whether this indicates any lack of robustness.”

In the areas of disagreement in this Joint Statement, each expert provided the following. Mr Coyne stated (inter alia):

“For the purposes of addressing the robustness of Horizon, I have applied the following definition of robustness:

‘The ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling.’ ”

In consideration of the likelihood of Horizon to be the cause of shortfalls in branches, Horizon is not determined to be robust in this regard because:

(a) it contained high levels of bugs, errors and defects as set out under Issue 1 above which created discrepancies in the branch accounts of Subpostmasters;

(b) it suffered failures of internal mechanisms which were intended to ensure integrity of data;

(c) the system did not enable such discrepancies to be detected, accurately identified and/or recorded either reliably, consistently or at all;

(d) the system did not reliably identify ‘Mis-keying’, which is inevitable in any system with user input, and did not reliably have in place functionality to restrict users from progressing a mis-key;

(e) it required numerous processes and workarounds to be in place to allow Fujitsu to modify data already recorded by Horizon, which would not be required in a “robust” system; and/or

(f) there were weaknesses and risks of errors and other sources of unreliability within Horizon.”

(italics present in original)

Dr Worden stated in the same Joint Statement:

“The definition of 'robust' proposed above by Mr Coyne is not adequate, for reasons given below. The term 'robust' is not, as implied in para 3.1 of the outline, either ill-defined or a piece of IT public relations. Robustness (which is closely related to resilience) is an engineering objective, and large parts of project budgets are devoted to achieving it. It receives its meaning in the phrase 'robust against... [some risk or threat]', and there are a large number of risks that business IT systems need to be robust against - such as hardware failures, communications failures, power cuts, disasters, user errors or fraud. These are the dimensions of robustness.

In all these dimensions, robustness does not mean 'be perfect'; it means 'address the risks of being imperfect'. The extent of robustness is to be interpreted as: in how many dimensions was Horizon robust? and: in each dimension, how large were the remaining risks?

In my report I shall survey the evidence I have found that Fujitsu paid sufficient attention to the dimensions of robustness, and that they did so successfully. I shall also address evidence from Mr Coyne implying that Horizon fell short of its robustness objectives.

In my current preliminary opinion, Horizon is a highly robust system, and this has important implications for the other Horizon issues, notably issue 1.”

It can be seen therefore that Dr Worden in the Joint Statement did not agree Mr Coyne’s definition, and expressly said it was not adequate. In any event, the meaning of any word – even “robust”, or “robustness” – ought to be capable of description by the parties themselves. Although on its face it did not appear that Dr Worden agreed with Mr Coyne’s definition, a footnote in the Post Office first set of post-hearing submissions suggested that Dr Worden was not disagreeing with the first part of Mr Coyne’s text, in other words that part of the text that contained his definition of robustness (which was in italics in the 1st Joint Statement). Obviously if the parties (or their experts) could agree the definition to be applied so far as the Horizon System is concerned, that ought to be identified. I therefore asked the Post Office via email whether it agreed with the definition adopted by Mr Coyne, and if not, what its alternative definition was.

This led to a further document being received from the Post Office dated 18 July 2019. It referred to the passage in the 1st Joint Statement (which is quoted at [40] above) as “the agreed definition”. That rather overlooks that Mr Coyne identified the definition of robustness which he was applying, and Dr Worden expressly disagreed with this in the same Joint Statement under the heading “Areas of Disagreement”, and stated “the definition of ‘robust’ proposed above by Mr Coyne is not adequate, for the reasons given below”. It also overlooks that in the 3rd Joint Statement, paragraph 3.1 had an agreed entry which stated the following:

“Irrespective of how you define the detail of robustness, in line with most other large-scale computer systems, Horizon's robustness has generally improved.

From our experience of other computer systems, Horizon is relatively robust. We agree that 'robust' does not mean infallible and therefore Horizon has and will continue to suffer faults. Robustness limits the impact of those faults and other adverse events.

This increase in robustness has, in part, developed from Post Office discovering bugs/errors and defects in live use and then applying fixes and improving monitoring.”

(emphasis added)

Later in the same document of 18 July 2019 the submission was made by the Post Office that “the robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences”. It was also submitted that “As Post Office understands it, this is what Mr Coyne meant when in his comments in [the 1st Joint Statement] he defined robustness as “the ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling”.

This was precisely the definition which Dr Worden, in his areas of disagreement on the 1st Joint Statement, described as “inadequate”. The end position therefore is as follows.

The claimants found “robustness” difficult to define in the abstract and tied it in with the other wording of Horizon Issue 3; a robust system would be “extremely unlikely to be the cause of shortfalls in branches”. That however is a consequence of how a robust system would operate, not a definition of what robustness means.

The Post Office defined it as follows: “the robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences”. The Post Office was also prepared to accept Mr Coyne’s italicised definition in the 1st Joint Statement, namely ‘The ability to withstand or overcome adverse conditions, namely, the ability of a system to perform correctly in any scenario, including where invalid inputs are introduced, with effective error handling”.

Mr Coyne applied the definition he set out in italics in the 1st Joint Statement, quoted in the immediately preceding paragraph of this judgment and at [41] above.

Dr Worden’s definition was as follows:

“Robustness (which is closely related to resilience) is an engineering objective, and large parts of project budgets are devoted to achieving it. It receives its meaning in the phrase 'robust against... [some risk or threat]', and there are a large number of risks that business IT systems need to be robust against - such as hardware failures, communications failures, power cuts, disasters, user errors or fraud. These are the dimensions of robustness.

In all these dimensions, robustness does not mean 'be perfect'; it means 'address the risks of being imperfect'. The extent of robustness is to be interpreted as: in how many dimensions was Horizon robust? and: in each dimension, how large were the remaining risks?”

The Post Office also submitted that Mr Coyne’s definition was not “materially different” to that of Dr Worden.

The Post Office made submissions in paragraph 3(b) of the written submissions dated 18 July 2019 on robustness that stated that Mr Coyne cannot have intended to exclude the effect of countermeasures when he considered the concept of robustness. I shall return to this topic when dealing with countermeasures. This is because some of the countermeasures considered by Dr Worden are not parts of the Horizon System at all, such as SPMs noticing adverse entries in their branch accounts, and the manual issuing of Transaction Corrections (TCs) by the Post Office (which both parties agree are outside of the Horizon System).

I do however accept the Post Office’s submissions that there is not a great or material difference in the definitions of robustness adopted by the parties’ experts. I do not accept the claimants’ submission that robustness is difficult to define. Dr Worden defined robustness by using what he termed as “the dimensions of robustness”. It is rather circular to describe the meaning of robustness as being “robust against” some particular risk. Although Mr Coyne provided his definition in the 1st Joint Statement, the statement by Dr Worden that this was “inadequate” may only have been aimed at the entirety of Mr Coyne’s entry in the areas of disagreement, as effectively accepted by the Post Office in their most recent written submissions on the subject. Whether that is an explanation of the lack of agreement in the Joint Statement, I also agree with the Post Office that Mr Coyne’s definition is not materially different to that used by Dr Worden.

Robustness is indeed an engineering concept. It means the ability of any system to withstand or overcome adverse conditions. A robust system is strong and effective in all or most conditions. The robustness of a system is the effectiveness of the system in managing the risks of imperfections (which are inevitable in any system) and their consequences; this is the same meaning as how robustness was described in the Post Office’s written submissions dated 18 July 19. Robustness does not mean perfection.

The exercise necessary above, to arrive at the definition of robustness in [54] above, is not judicial pedantry. Given the central importance of robustness to the disputes about the Horizon System, and the Horizon Issues, it is in my judgment essential. It is mildly surprising, given how central the assertion of robustness has been to the Post Office’s defence of the Horizon System, that Dr Worden’s interpretation of the term has been relied upon so heavily by the Post Office, given the term was used by the Post Office for some years prior to his involvement.

However, regardless of that passing observation, I find that both experts correctly understood what robustness in fact means, and applied the definition at [54] above in considering their expert evidence. I will return to the expert evidence in some detail later in the judgment, including in the Technical Appendix. 

Peer demands judge-led inquiry into Post Office Horizon fiasco

Lord Arbuthnot
James, now Lord Arbuthnot, former MP for North East Hampshire, reacted to yesterday's High Court judgment by calling for judge-led inquiry into the Horizon fiasco. In a statement issued this morning he said:

“The subpostmasters have been vindicated in every respect.  It is an excellent Christmas present, but won at great cost.  The cost falls partly on the taxpayer but also heavily on the subpostmasters themselves, who will have their damages reduced by the amount the litigation funders will (justifiably) deduct.

“Now that these battles are being won, it is time to turn our attention to how it all came about and went so far.  We need an inquiry and, since the Post Office has repeatedly given inaccurate information including to me, it needs to be led by a judge.  It may be that the best person to conduct the inquiry would be the judge who already has such extensive knowledge of the details, Sir Peter Fraser.  He has done much of the work already."

Lord Arbuthnot led the cross-party parliamentary group of MPs who came together after so many Subpostmasters in their constituencies contacted them begging for help. He remains a member of the All Party Parliamentary Group which looks into matters relating to the Post Office, led by the Labour MP Gill Furniss.

On another note, the Law Gazette has picked up on Sir Peter Fraser's decision to refer the evidence of  Fujitsu employees in the Horizon trial to the Director of Public Prosecutions. There are cans and worms everywhere in this story.

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.

Choose an amount

They did it.

Postmasters celebrating outside the Rolls Building on 16 Dec 2019
What a judgment. What an announcement.

I have spent many days of my life in Court 26 of the Rolls Building. Days I will never get back. Some were tedious, many were fascinating, a few were genuinely dramatic, but none held a candle to what happened yesterday afternoon.

As we know from the press statement on Wednesday last week, this litigation was supposed to be dead. Settled with an apology and £58m in compensation from the Post Office. Well - today's judgment re-energised the corpse and now the judge appears to have set in motion a Frankenstein's monster which could lay about the "nation's most trusted brand" and the IT firm which operates the Post Office's Horizon computer system, Fujitsu.

Court 26 is a big, badly designed room. It is around the size of a basketball court. Whilst it has generous amounts of space compared to most courtrooms, it is unsuited to coping with the dozens of claimants, their families, supporters, journalists, lawyers and observers who packed in there at 1.30pm on Monday 16 December 2019 to witness the second trial judgment being handed down.

Malicious prosecution

The first interesting discussion was about the possibility of claimants going after the Post Office for malicious prosecution. Normally with a settlement of this nature, claimants are prohibited from taking the defendant to court for any reason ever ever again, but the claimants' QC Patrick Green wanted the judge to make an order that claimants who have criminal prosecutions against their name should not be disbarred from pursuing the Post Office over criminal matters, simply because they have signed up to a civil settlement. After seeking agreement from the Post Office's QC Owain Draper (which, it transpired, was a formality), the judge made the order.

Then the judge made an announcement which stood outside of the 177,211 word findings he had just handed down. He told the parties and the court he had "grave concerns" about the evidence of the Fujitsu employees; so much so that he felt the veracity of evidence provided by Fujitsu employees in a number of Post Office prosecutions of Subpostmasters needed to be properly scrutinised. To that end, he would be supplying a dossier to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further investigation.

No one was expecting this. I was sitting with journalists from Computer Weekly, the Daily Mail and the Press Association and we all looked at each other, thinking pretty much the same thing. Fujitsu is now in the game.

The judgment

But why? How? I still haven't read every word of the Horizon trial judgment, so there may be some mitigating comments, but here are the choice quotes:

"The Post Office’s approach to evidence, even despite their considerable resources which are being liberally deployed at considerable cost, amounts to attack and disparagement of the claimants individually and collectively, together with the wholly unsatisfactory evidence of Fujitsu personnel such as Mr Parker."

Who is Mr Parker? Glad you asked:

"Mr Stephen Parker is... the Head of Post Office Application Support. He is therefore a very senior person. He first started work on what was then called the Royal Mail Group Account in 1997, which was before the introduction of Horizon. He has continued to provide support to the Post Office Account in the various roles he has occupied at Fujitsu throughout the whole of Horizon’s life, by which he meant both Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online."

So he, under oath, would tell the judge, the truth, right?

"Mr Parker chose specifically to give the impression in his 1st witness statement that Fujitsu did not have the power (the word Mr Parker expressly chose) to inject transactions into the counter at branches, even though he knew that it did. This paints him in a very poor light as a credible witness."

What did the judge think about Mr Parker's evidence, when exposed to cross-examination?

"I consider that Mr Parker, and the team who assisted him, sought to portray the Horizon system – Legacy Horizon and Horizon Online – in a light as favourable as possible to Fujitsu, regardless of its own internal evidence to the contrary, and regardless of the facts."

And the judge's conclusion about Fujitsu in general?

"Fujitsu do not,... appear to me to have properly and fully investigated.. myriad problems, nor did Fujitsu categorise such incidents correctly. They also seem to have moved away, in their investigations, from concluding that there were any issues with the software wherever it was possible for them to do so, regardless of evidence to the contrary, an approach that has been carried into the Fujitsu evidence for the Horizon Issues trial."

What about the Post Office?

They come in for the sort of pasting we have, perhaps, got used to. Their approach:

"has amounted, in reality, to bare assertions and denials that ignore what has actually occurred… It amounts to the 21st century equivalent of maintaining that the earth is flat.”

“A theme contained within some of the internal documents is an extreme sensitivity (seeming to verge, on occasion, to institutional paranoia) concerning any information that may throw doubt on the reputation of Horizon, or expose it to further scrutiny."

There may be more in parts of the judgment I have not yet reached, but this, to me, is the uncontrovertable conclusion which vindicates everything campaigning Subpostmasters have been saying for years:

"It was possible for bugs, errors or defects of the nature alleged by the claimants to have the potential both (a) to cause apparent or alleged discrepancies or shortfalls relating to Subpostmasters’ branch accounts or transactions, and also (b) to undermine the reliability of Horizon accurately to process and to record transactions as alleged by the claimants.... Further, all the evidence in the Horizon Issues trial shows not only was there the potential for this to occur, but it actually has happened, and on numerous occasions." [my italics]

Alan Bates was the lead claimant in the litigation and founder of the Justice for Subpostmasters' Alliance. His dogged determination to see the Post Office held to account is well documented. He is not a man who likes the spotlight, but I am sure he would have been at court yesterday if he were not recovering from a recent hospital visit. He sent through this statement from his hideout in Wales:

Alan Bates
"This judgment, like that of the Common Issues trial vindicates everything we have been saying for years. The real problem we have been left with is the unrecovered expenses which we have had to incur to pursue the litigation and which include considerable litigation financing fees, all of which have devoured most of the £58m damages, leaving little left to be shared between the group.

"It would seem, from some recent excellent research work Eleanor Shaihk undertook, that successive governments have failed in their statutory duty to oversee and manage Post Office and this is something that we are planning to ask our MPs to raise next year.  If it turns out to be correct, we will be wanting to recover everything we have had to spend doing the job government should have done.

"It isn't over yet, just the end of another chapter."

There will be a number of people who will want to thank Alan for what he has achieved. I wish him a speedy convalescence.

Media interest

After the judgment was handed down, outside court, there was quite the scene. Subpostmasters giving interviews en masse. Banners, photo ops, the lot. I saw a couple of TV cameras there, and whilst I haven't watched it yet, I am told this story finally made it onto the BBC ten o'clock news.

I interviewed every claimant I could persuade to speak to me, then I got a cab to Broadcasting House where I went into the BBC Radio 4 studios to do a hit for Evan Davis's PM programme (listen here, 45 minutes into the show). After that I spoke to Rebecca Jones on the BBC News Channel.
You can also listen to a lengthy interview I conducted this morning with one of the BBCs best presenters, Dotun Adebayo, on BBC Radio 5 live's Up All Night. It starts 33 minutes into the programme.

Also, if I could offer a plug for my current employers, may I recommend you tune in to Channel 5 News at 6.30pm today (Tuesday) 17 December, where I will be discussing this story further.

I hope to have read the whole of the judgment in its entirety by then. And I will post up everything I find on this website.

Final note

There are many takeaways from the second trial judgment day. The main one is that the claimants were apparently told in a pre-judgment meeting with their solicitors that the most they can expect to get from the £58m settlement is £8m - £11m. This is the sum that will be left after the legal fees have been paid and the litigation funders have taken their cut.

Watching what the Criminal Cases Review Commission does next will be interesting. Will it refer all 35 cases it's looking at to the Court of Appeal?

How is the Director of Public Prosecutions going to react to being sent a dossier of evidence by a judge about the quality of evidence from Fujitsu used in criminal prosecutions by the Post Office?

Will there be a public inquiry? The journalist Tony Collins has already explained how it could come about. Don't be surprised if various parliamentarians start calling for one.

UPDATE: At 8.38am this morning Lord Arbuthnot called for a judge-led inquiry. It'll be interesting to see if his Conservative colleagues in the new administration are minded to listen.

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.


Choose an amount

Monday, 16 December 2019

Horizon trial judgment is handed down - inc transcript

Sir Peter Fraser
The handing down of the Horizon trial judgment on 16 dec 2019 was expected to be a damp squib. After all, the parties had settled five days previously.

But it all went off. You can read my report here.

The following is about ensuring the judge's exact comments in court are made available to all as they could be of benefit in any forthcoming legal actions.

The most interesting bit came at the end of the hearing. Having handed down the judgment and dealt with housekeeping, Sir Peter Fraser gave the following announcement:
"Based on the knowledge that I have gained both from conducting the trial and writing the Horizon Issues judgment, I have very grave concerns regarding the voracity of evidence given by Fujitsu employees to other courts in previous proceedings about the known existence of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. These previous proceedings include the High Court in at least one civil case brought by the Post Office against a sub- postmaster and the Crown Court in a greater number of criminal cases, also brought by the Post Office against sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses.
Max Hill QC
After very careful consideration, I have therefore decided, in the interests of justice, to send the papers in the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, so he may consider whether the matter to which I have referred should be the subject of any prosecution."
Sir Peter went on:
"It will be entirely a matter for the DPP what, if anything, he does in respect of this referral... I wish to make it clear that the specific subject to which I will drawing the specific attention of the DPP relates to the evidence on previous occasions of Fujitsu employees."
Notwithstanding the likely homonymical typo in the transcript (I think his Lordship was understood to say "veracity" rather than "voracity"), Fujitsu, and the employees who gave evidence against Lee Castleton, Seema Misra et al are now firmly in the firing line.

If you want to know exactly why the judge felt the need to pass on a folder to the DPP I would recommend you have a crack at the long, but very readable judgment.

In it, the judge finds Andy Dunks, Fujitsu's IT Security Analyst "expressly sought to mislead" him.

He says Fujitsu's Head of Post Office Application Support, Stephen Parker, effectively lied to the court, by choosing "specifically to give the impression in his 1st witness statement that Fujitsu did not have the power (the word Mr Parker expressly chose) to inject transactions into the counter at branches, even though he knew that it did."

And the judge finds in conclusion that Fujitsu:
"do not... appear to me to have properly and fully investigated... myriad problems, nor did Fujitsu categorise... incidents correctly. They also seem to have moved away, in their investigations, from concluding that there were any issues with the software wherever it was possible for them to do so, regardless of evidence to the contrary."
If the DPP is minded to do anything, it might not be long before Inspector Knacker starts knocking on a few doors.

So, for completeness, here is a full transcript of the final hearing, which took place in Court 26 of the High Court's Rolls Building, starting at 2.30pm on Monday 16 Dec 2019. Enjoy:

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
No. QB-2016-004710
Rolls Building Fetter Lane London, EC4A 1NL
Monday, 16 December 2019
BETWEEN:

Claimants

BATES & ORS

- and -

Defendant

POST OFFICE LTD
Before:
MR JUSTICE FRASER

MR P. GREEN QC (instructed by Freeths LLP) appeared on behalf of the Claimants.
MR O. DRAPER (instructed by Womble Bond Dickinson (UK) LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: There are three items on the agenda for this afternoon. The first is handing down the judgment. 

This was distributed in draft on 28 November 2019 to the parties’ legal advisors and two members of the steering committee, but it was under embargo until now. The usual embargo in this case was slightly amended so that the two mediators involved in assisting the parties settle the litigation were also permitted to see the draft judgment. That judgment is to be handed now, which means its contents become public, so I am going to ask my learned clerk to do that. 

There are a number of printed copies. There are ten in folders; there are eight printed copies not in folders. The judgment has three appendices, one is the technical appendix, one is a glossary and one is a summary of the findings on the numbers of bugs, defects and errors that I have found to exist within the Horizon system. 

If anyone who is in court would like a copy and they put their email address on the three forms which have been provided for that purpose, or they give my learned clerk their email address, they will be emailed a copy straightaway after this hearing. 

The judgment is also going to be placed on the Bailii website which is at www.bailii.org with the neutral citation [2019] EWHC 3408 QB. It will also be placed on the judicial website straight after this hearing at www.judiciary.uk. If anybody does go onto the Bailii website and search for it under the name Bates v Post Office, they should just remember that it is the sixth judgment, so it is Bates v Post Office (No 6). That is the first item. 

The next item, Mr Green.

MR GREEN: My Lord, the parties, as your Lordship know, agreed a settlement to be 
incorporated in a Tomlin order to be made by your Lordship, subject to your Lordship’s approval, of course. We have revised it in the light of your Lordship’s observations about the malicious prosecution claims and the provision made for those. 

The structure is that the settlement does not embrace the malicious prosecution claims to which that paragraph refers, which are those of convicted claimants, and that is why there is a provision in paragraph 3 that neither the stay provided for in paragraph 1 nor the discontinuance provided for in paragraph 2 prejudice the right of any convicted claimant to bring an individual claim for malicious prosecution. 

What we have added, your Lordship will see, that last sentence, which is to the extent that convicted claimants require permission under CPR rule 38.7 to make another individual claim for malicious prosecution following discontinuance under paragraph 2 above. Such permission is granted. 

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. Now, that provision – I will just check this with Mr Draper in a moment – as I understand the operation of it is so that if there is any claimant who is currently subject to the group litigation wishes to advance a claim for malicious prosecution---- 

MR GREEN: Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: --that is not caught by the settlement.

MR GREEN: Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Because that is a claim that is actually included on the claim form. 

MR GREEN: Your Lordship is absolutely right. Exactly.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. And the discontinuance does not yet occur until an application 
is made under paragraph 2.

MR GREEN: Exactly right. So, it is a Tomlin order until the application for discontinuance is 
made and granted, and then it comes to an end.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right, I am just going to ensure that Mr Draper is on board; I am sure 
he is. Mr Draper, I see you appear for the Post Office today.

MR DRAPER: I do appear for the Post Office. My Lord, yes, the provision there is just to 
ensure there is no possible argument about abuse of process if there is, if you like, what 
might be contended to be a second claim in relation to malicious prosecution.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: That is why I raised the point because I think the intention of the 
parties is that any such claimant in that situation issues a fresh claim form. Is that right? 

MR DRAPER: My Lord, yes.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: But for the moment this action is not yet discontinued in any event. It 
is just subject to a stay under the Tomlin order.

MR DRAPER: That is right.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. Thank you very much. I am going to make that order. I have 
signed one copy of the Tomlin order. I am going to hand that down now, as well as return the confidential schedules that were lodged at the same time. I will give those to Mr Green. So far as the parties are concerned, is there anything else today? 

MR DRAPER: My Lord, no. 

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Right. There is one more thing from the court’s point of view. By signing the consent order that I have just signed, today is the final substantive hearing day of the Post Office Group litigation. This means that I am therefore effectively no longer the managing judge. 

What I have to say now does not have any effect upon that function in any event and I will still be able to make any further procedural order in January 2020 if one is sought, as anticipated in paragraph 2 of the Tomlin order, for the withdrawal of the group litigation order. However, I am making these comments now in open court at the conclusion of the Horizon Issues trial in the interests of open justice and transparency. 

The Horizon Issues trial involved very detailed analysis of the Horizon computer system.
In the year of its inception in 2000 up to 2018, in order to address the Horizon issues, both the evidence and the judgment that I have just handed down considered in great detail the contents of contemporaneous documents within Fujitsu and the Post Office dealing with the operation of the Horizon system generally, but particularly in respect of the known existence of Fujitsu of bugs, errors and defects in Horizon. 

Based on the knowledge that I have gained both from conducting the trial and writing the Horizon Issues judgment, I have very grave concerns regarding the voracity of evidence given by Fujitsu employees to other courts in previous proceedings about the known existence of bugs, errors and defects in the Horizon system. These previous proceedings include the High Court in at least one civil case brought by the Post Office against a sub- postmaster and the Crown Court in a greater number of criminal cases, also brought by the Post Office against sub-postmasters and sub-postmistresses. 

After very careful consideration, I have therefore decided, in the interests of justice, to send the papers in the case to the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Max Hill QC, so he may consider whether the matter to which I have referred should be the subject of any prosecution. 

In arriving at that decision I have considered the relevant authorities, including:
  • R v Patel [2016] EWCA Crim 2001, which was a decision in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division of Lord Justice Simon and Mr Justice Hickinbottom, as he then was, at paragraph 84; 
  • Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208 QB, a decision of Mrs Justice Hallett, as she then was, at paragraph 50; 
  • and a number of others.
It will be entirely a matter for the DPP what, if anything, he does in respect of this referral. The contents of the letter that I send him will be confidential, although I will copy it to the parties in this litigation through their solicitors. 

I wish to make it clear that the specific subject to which I will drawing the specific attention of the DPP relates to the evidence on previous occasions of Fujitsu employees. 

This matter is entirely separate from any aspects of the process currently underway at the Criminal Cases Review Commission in respect of claimants who were convicted. Paragraph 66 of the judgment that I have just handed down explains why this court has no involvement in the process underway at the Criminal Cases Review Commission. 

Mr Green, Mr Draper, nothing else?

MR GREEN: Nothing further, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Mr Draper?

MR DRAPER: No observations, my Lord.

MR GREEN: My Lord, may we thank you on behalf of all parties for the hard work that has 
gone into several thousand pages of judgments.

MR JUSTICE FRASER: Yes. My learned clerk did actually do a word count on all six of the 
judgments and it is just slightly fewer than War and Peace, but not by very many. Thank you all very much, and if I could wish everyone a very happy Christmas.

[Judge rises]

*************************
If you have enjoyed reading the content on this website, I would be grateful if you could chuck a few quid in the tip jar below. Contributors who give £20 or more get regular "secret" emails which have all the info and gossip about this litigation and its wider repercussions. Click here to see how and where your money is being spent.



Choose an amount